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I.  INTRODUCTION      
On June 19, 2017, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
Matal v. Tam (Tam).1  Writing for the Court, Justice Alito held that the “may 
disparage” provision of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act (disparagement clause) is 
unconstitutional because it violates the Free Speech clause of the First 
Amendment.2  In an article published in the summer of 2016, Blackhawk Down or 
Blackhorse Down? The Lanham Act’s Prohibition of Trademarks that “May Disparage” & 
the First Amendment, I argued that this was the likely outcome for many reasons.3  
My principal arguments were that, if analyzed under traditional First Amendment 
principles, the disparagement clause is both overbroad and vague,4 and that, if 
analyzed under commercial speech principles, the provision fails to pass muster 
under the Central Hudson test.5  
Justice Alito embraced reasoning similar to mine, focusing on the First 
Amendment to explain why the provision is unconstitutional.6  Blackhawk Down 
or Blackhorse Down? and Justice Alito’s opinion both examine the complex nexus 
of the intersection between the First Amendment and trademark law.  The 
Court’s opinion synthesizes doctrine and policy that bridge these two critical 
fields—namely Constitutional Law and Intellectual Property Law.  But this 
Article steps back, “zooms out,” to consider not the complexities of those 
branches of law, but rather the “big picture” of the broader foundations of them.   
                                                                                                                   
 1 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 2 Id. at 1751.  For a relatively concise yet thorough overview of the Free Speech clause of the 
First Amendment, see, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613–789 (4th ed. 2010).  Justice Alito’s decision is clear, fairly concise, and 
thorough.  See GILMORE GRANT, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 16 (1977) (“Judges are trained to 
explain the reasons for their decisions.  They may not always be successful, but the opinions of our 
better judges set a model for rational and humane discourse which the rest of us can only envy.”). 
 3 Russ VerSteeg, Blackhawk Down or Blackhorse Down? The Lanham Act’s Prohibition of Trademarks 
that “May Disparage” & the First Amendment, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 677 (2016); id. at 770 (“This Article 
argues that the ‘may disparage’ prohibition of § 2(a) conflicts with the First Amendment for five 
reasons.  First, traditional First Amendment analysis indicates that it is a vague and overbroad 
content/viewpoint-based restriction.  Second, if trademarks are analyzed as a kind of commercial 
speech, § 2(a) fails the Central Hudson test.  Third, a careful reading of Walker demonstrates that 
federal trademark registration is not government speech and thus is not exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.  Fourth, principles drawn from copyright law, another important branch of 
intellectual property, suggest additional reasons why First Amendment protection is important for 
trademark policy in the context of § 2(a)’s ‘may disparage’ prohibition.  Finally, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine identifies the reasons why withholding the benefits of federal registration 
pursuant to § 2(a) creates an abridgement of free speech.”). 
 4  VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 730–48.  For a discussion of “overbreadth,” see generally NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.2, at 631–32.  For a discussion of “vagueness,” see generally id. § 16.3, 
at 633–34. 
 5 VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 748–55.  See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980).  See also NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.12(b), at 680–82. 
 6 See infra Part I.B. 
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To this end, this Article considers the Supreme Court’s Tam decision, drawing 
primarily (but by no means exclusively) on the perspectives of five historical and 
jurisprudential scholars in particular: Sir William Blackstone;7 Professor Frank 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See generally DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1938); LEWIS C. WARDEN, 
THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE (1938); William Blake Odgers, Sir William Blackstone, 27 YALE L.J. 599 
(1918); William Blake Odgers, Sir William Blackstone, 28 YALE L.J. 542 (1919); Douglas H. Cook, Sir 
William Blackstone: A Life and Legacy Set Apart for God’s Work, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 169, 177 (2001); 
Sir William Blackstone (July 10, 1723–February 14, 1780) is primarily remembered today for his 
four-volume treatise on English law, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769).  And this 
Article relies heavily on that text for principles of property law, fraud and deceit, matters related to 
law and reputation, and the connection between freedom of expression and religion.  Shortly after 
publication, the Commentaries became a principal text for those studying law in both England and 
North America.  Blackstone briefly practiced law but devoted most of his career to lecturing and 
writing on the subject.  He also served for nine years in in the House of Commons in Parliament.  
In the final decade of his life, he sat as a judge in the Court of Common Pleas.  Although not 
immune to contradictions, his explanations of legal doctrine were praised for their directness and 
clarity. 
3
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Schechter;8 Senator Sam Ervin;9 Professor Jerome Hall;10 and, Professor Grant 
Gilmore.11  This is not a random assortment of strangers.  Rather, each man 
                                                                                                                   
 8 See generally William G. Barber, A “Rational” Approach for Analyzing Dilution Claims: The Three 
Hallmarks of True Trademark Dilution, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 25, 28 (2005); Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas 
in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 
474 (2008); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 158 (2008); Amy Schechter, Daughter of Dr. Solomon Schechter, Held for Murder 
in Strike, http://www.jta.org/1929/07/23/archive/amy-schechter-daughter-of-dr-solomon-schec 
hter-held-for-murder-in-strike (last visited Aug. 13, 2017); David Schechter, How Solomon Schechter’s 
Daughter Became a Card-Carrying Communist, http://forward.com/culture/longform/3213 72/how-
solomon-shechters-daughter-became-the-life-of-her-party/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017); Professor 
Frank Schechter (June 24, 1890–September 26, 1937) is best known for his writing on trademark 
history and trademark dilution theory.  Most of the information in this Article relating to the early 
history of Trademark law comes from his book, The Historical Foundations of Law Relating to Trade-
Marks (1925).  He served in World War One in Eastern France.  It was there that he was exposed 
to poisonous gas that probably contributed to his premature death from respiratory illness.  
Professor Schechter earned both undergraduate and law degrees at Columbia.  In 1929 when his 
sister, Amy was on trial in North Carolina for her alleged involvement in the murder of a police 
officer, he traveled there to assist in her defense. 
 9 See generally Jeffrey L. Vagle, Laird v. Tatum and Article III Standing in Surveillance Cases, 18 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1055, 1065 (2016); Douglas S. Onley, Treading on Sacred Ground: Congress’s Power to 
Subject White House Advisers to Senate Confirmation, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1183 (1996); James R. 
Dickenson, Sen. Sam Ervin, Key Figure In Watergate Probe Dies, WASH. POST (1985), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/stories/ervinobit.htm (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2017); Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (The Watergate Committee), U.S. 
Senate Historical Office, Washington, D.C., https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/investigations/pdf/Watergate_investigation_citations.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2017); 
Samuel James Ervin (September 27, 1896–April 23, 1985) served in numerous public service 
capacities during his distinguished career.  A World War One veteran and graduate of the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Harvard Law School, he practiced law, served in the North 
Carolina House of Representatives and in the United States Senate, and was also an associate justice 
of the North Carolina Supreme Court.  As a junior senator, he was appointed to the committee 
that investigated the misdeeds of Senator Joseph McCarthy.  And in the twilight of his political 
career, he gained national recognition as the Chairman of the committee that investigated the 
Watergate scandal.  He was universally acknowledged as the Senate’s pre-eminent scholar and 
authority on United States Constitutional Law.  His autobiography, Preserving the Constitution: The 
Autobiography of Sam Ervin, provides the basis in this Article regarding the Founding Fathers’ views 
on the meaning of the First Amendment in particular, and the Constitution in general. 
 10 See generally Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall’s Studies in 
Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory, 34 IND. L. REV. 206 (1959); Jerome Hall, 91, Legal Scholar Who Was 
Professor and Author, N.Y. TIMES (1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/11/us/jerome-hall-9 
1-legal-scholar-who-was-professor-and-author.html; Jerome Hall (February 4, 1901–March 2, 
1992) spent most of his professional life as a professor of law at the University of Indiana at 
Bloomington.  He earned his undergraduate and law degrees at the University of Chicago and was 
a Fulbright scholar.  He practiced corporate law in Chicago, Illinois in the 1920’s.  During the 1930’s 
Hall earned advanced legal degrees at Columbia and Harvard.  His scholarship focused primarily 
on Criminal Law, Comparative Law, and Jurisprudence.  His work incorporated an interdisciplinary 
approach, and he also left his mark on the international shape of law, doing work on behalf of the 
U.S. State Department assisting in drafting laws in Korea, India, Japan, and the Philippines.  In 
addition to his teaching and writing, Professor Hall held positions of distinction in numerous 
academic and civic organizations, and received honors and awards of recognition for his 
4
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offers a unique point of view regarding the role of law in general, and each also 
adds expertise to the conversation that informs our modern-day understanding 
of the more specific foundations of the legal principles of trademark law and 
constitutional law.  
Part Two of this Article summarizes the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tam.  
This part also speculates about the immediate ramifications of the decision for 
the future of registration of marks that some individuals and groups deem 
offensive.  Justice Alito invokes trademark history as a means of providing 
context for his decision.12  On the theory that historical perspective often helps 
us better understand and confront contemporary issues, Part Three follows 
Justice Alito’s lead and reaches into the roots of law to provide perspective 
regarding several legal principles and relationships that provide the foundations 
for trademark law and policy.  Part Three explores the historical and 
jurisprudential foundations of both trademark law and the First Amendment, 
analyzing, in particular, the tension inherent in the disparagement clause of § 2(a) 
and the freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment.  This Part relies 
primarily on the observations of Blackstone, Schechter, and Ervin.  Part Three 
closes by taking an even broader view of these issues, reflecting in particular on 
a more macroscopic jurisprudential analysis.  Part Four proposes one potential 
solution to relieve some of the tension between those concerned that offensive 
trademarks will overtake the American marketplace versus those who wish to 
champion the cause of freedom of speech.  The Conclusion briefly summarizes 
the main points of the Article. 
II.  MATAL V. TAM 
A.  OVERVIEW  
The Tam decision has little to do with the types of trademark issues that 
ordinarily concern the general public.  The general public, which typically gets its 
                                                                                                                   
contributions to law and society.  Here, his book, Foundations of Jurisprudence supplies insights and 
lends valuable perspective. 
 11 See generally Friedrich Kessler, Grant Gilmore As I Remember Him, 92 YALE L.J. 4 (1982); Robert 
A. Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore’s the Death of Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 32 (1995); Richard 
Danzig, The Death of Contract and the Life of the Profession: Observations on the Intellectual State of Legal 
Academia, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1977); Peter Linzer, Law’s Unity – an Essay for the Master 
Contortionist, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 183 (1995); Grant Gilmore (1910–1982) is perhaps best known for 
his controversial book, The Death of Contract, published in 1974.  Professor Gilmore, who specialized 
primarily in Commercial Law, received a Ph.D. in Romance Languages at Yale University, where 
he taught French before beginning his legal studies.  While teaching law at Yale, he helped draft the 
Uniform Commercial Code.  He wrote The Ages of American Law (1977) as his career drew to a close, 
and this Article leans on that book as a principal source for broad historical context. 
 12 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (“Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origins, and 
trademarks were protected at common law and in equity at the time of the founding of our 
country.” (citations omitted)). 
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information about trademarks from reports in the media regarding infringement 
disputes, probably knows far more about cases concerning trademark 
infringement rather than the subtleties surrounding the First Amendment and the 
technical aspects of § 2 of the Lanham Act.13  Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
contains provisions that explain why certain trademarks may be disqualified from 
federal registration.14  But before even considering the topic of trademark 
registration, it is helpful to first examine the very basis of legal protection for 
trademarks.  In the history of trademark law, scholars and judges have addressed 
the threshold issue of whether the legal protections for trademarks should be 
focused primarily on an owner’s property rights in a mark or on the public’s interest 
in protection from fraud and deceit.15  To a certain extent, these twin concerns, 
prominent in the history of the evolution of trademark doctrine, are also germane 
to the Tam decision.  A person who applies to register a mark that may disparage 
persons, institutions, or beliefs is primarily interested in protecting his property 
rights by the acquisition of additional protections afforded to federal registrants.16  
And, although neither fraud nor deceit are true concerns relating to marks that 
may disparage, nevertheless the perceptions of certain members of the public are 
a vital interest; specifically relevant are the perceptions of the people who feel 
disparaged.  Consequently, these two bedrock interests—the interests of 
trademark owners in protecting their property rights and the interests of the 
members of the public—are also key interests affected by the Tam decision.  
Hence, it will be useful to keep in mind these two important interests. 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Id.. at 1759 (“And it is unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the public has any idea what 
federal registration of a trademark means.  ‘The purchasing public knows no more about trademark 
registrations than a man walking down the street in a strange city knows about legal title to the land 
and buildings he passes.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
 14 Id. at 1753 (“The Lanham Act contains provisions that bar certain trademarks from the 
principal register.”); see also VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 683. 
 15 Part III examines these historical concerns in greater detail.  See, e.g., FRANK I. SCHECHTER, 
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 141 (1925) (“[T]here is a 
steady stream of substantial English authority holding the common law action for trade-mark 
infringement to be one of deceit. . . .”); id. at 143 (“In 1902 in Addley Bourne v. Swan & Edgar, Ld. 
the leading authorities on this point were reviewed by Farwell, J., who concluded that, although in 
cases of trade-mark infringement no fraudulent misrepresentation had been made to the plaintiff, 
nevertheless, whether correctly or not, the law was definitely settled that the proper common law 
action for trade-mark infringement is an action in deceit.” (footnotes omitted)).  See also Benjamin 
G. Paster, Trademarks – Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 566 (1969) (“No such theory 
was accepted in the common law courts, and in them fraud remained an essential ingredient of a 
cause of action for the infringement of a trademark down to the date of the amalgamation effected 
by the Judicature Acts.”). 
 16 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1750 (“Federal registration . . . ‘confers important legal rights and benefits 
on trademark owners who register their trademarks.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
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B.  SUMMARY OF MATAL V. TAM 
1. Overview.  After the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
denied registration for “The Slants” as a service mark, pursuant to § 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act, which prohibits registration of marks that “may 
disparage . . . persons . . .,” the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) 
affirmed the PTO examining attorney’s refusal of registration.17  The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), en banc, later reversed the TTAB, 
holding that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech clause of the First 
Amendment.18  Then, shortly after the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear the Tam case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals suspended 
its consideration of the Blackhorse case, pending the outcome of Tam.19 
Justice Alito wrote three sections of the Tam opinion that hold the 
disparagement clause unconstitutional.20  In short, he writes, “this provision 
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  It offends a bedrock 
First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it 
expresses ideas that offend.”21  Justice Kennedy wrote a two-part concurring 
opinion (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor), concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment.22  Two sections of Justice Alito’s opinion are 
unanimous—Part I and Part III.A. Only Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Thomas 
joined in Parts III.B, III.C, Part IV, and the introductory paragraph of Part III.  
Justice Thomas did not join Part II, and he wrote a brief concurring opinion. 
2.  Justice Alito’s Opinion.  Justice Alito begins Part I.A by briefly describing 
relevant trademark statutes and some historical and jurisprudential background 
of trademark law.23  Part I.B then explains a number of nuances regarding 
protection for unregistered trademarks and details the benefits provided by 
federal registration of a mark on the Principal Register.24  Part I.C follows by 
outlining the operation of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act and the role it plays in 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Id.. at 1754. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015). See Supreme Court to 
Weigh in on Disparaging Trademarks, MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www. 
manatt.com/Insights/Articles/2016/Supreme-Court-to-Weigh-in-on-Disparaging-Trademark 
(Pro-Football, Inc., appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit in October 2015.  “After the petition 
for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court in Tam, Pro-Football, Inc., filed a rare ‘certiorari 
before judgment’ petition with the Court which, if granted, would have allowed Blackhorse to be 
joined with Tam for Supreme Court consideration, even though the Fourth Circuit had not yet 
ruled in the case.  The Supreme Court denied Pro-Football, Inc.’s petition on October 3, 2016, but 
on October 19, 2016, the Fourth Circuit agreed to postpone Blackhorse until after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tam as the Tam decision could directly affect the outcome in Blackhorse.”). 
 20 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 1765–74. 
 23 Id. at 1751–62. 
 24 Id. at 1752–53. 
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establishing the doctrine that applies to determine whether an applicant’s mark 
qualifies for registration on the Principal Register.25  Here, Justice Alito also 
identifies § 2(a)’s disparagement clause as the causus belli in this case:  
At issue in this case is one such provision, which we will call “the 
disparagement clause.”  This provision prohibits the registration of 
a trademark “which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into 
contempt, or disrepute.” § 1052(a).  This clause appeared in the 
original Lanham Act and has remained the same to this day.26  
He also describes the mechanics of how the PTO and courts traditionally have 
assessed whether a mark violates the disparagement clause.27  Finally, Part I ends 
by noting that Simon Tam “chose this moniker [i.e., “The Slants”] in order to 
‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes about people of Asian ancestry.”28  
This part also outlines the path that the litigation took to reach the Court.29  
Justice Alito pointedly notes that the Court granted certiorari expressly “in order 
to decide whether the disparagement clause ‘is facially invalid under the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.’ ”30  
Part II summarily dispatches Tam’s argument that “the [disparagement] clause 
does not reach marks that disparage racial or ethnic groups.”31  Tam had argued 
“that the term ‘persons’ includes only natural and juristic persons’ not ‘non-
juristic entities such as racial and ethnic groups.’ ”32  According to Justice Alito, 
the plain language of § 2(a) contradicts this argument.33 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Id. at 1750. 
 26 Id. at 1753. 
 27 Id. at 1753–54. 
 28 Id. at 1754.  See also VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 698, n.76 (“Although not unprecedented, it is 
atypical for the applicant to be a member of the group of persons whom the trademark examining 
attorney thinks may experience disparagement.”). 
 29 137 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 30 Id. at 1755.  In the petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Director of 
the UPTO noted that “Section 2(a) . . . provided that no trademark shall be refused registration on 
account of its nature unless, inter alia, it ‘[c]onsists of . . . matter which may disparage . . . persons, 
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute.’ ”  The question presented was therefore “[w]hether the disparagement provision in 15 
U.S.C. 1052(a) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”  Brief for 
Petitioner at I, Lee v. Tam, 2016 WL 1593780 (U.S.) (Appellate Petition, Motion, and Filing No. 
15-1293 at 1).  On September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the petition 
for writ of certiorari in an opinion which stated simply: “Petition for writ of certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted.”  Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).  For a 
discussion of “facial invalidity” and “as applied invalidity,” see, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 2, § 16.1, at 629–30. 
 31 137 S. Ct. at 1755. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 1756. 
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All eight participating justices joined Part III.A, which leaves little doubt that 
this section is the most important of the Court’s opinion.  Because “[t]he Free 
Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech,” if, as the Government 
contended, trademarks registered on the Principal Register constitute 
“government speech,” then the First Amendment cannot invalidate the 
disparagement clause.34  Justice Alito succinctly observes that “imposing a 
requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on government speech would be paralyzing,” 
adding that “[w]hen a government entity embarks on a course of action, it 
necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others.”35  He offers, by way 
of example, the government’s pro-war posters created during World War II, 
which promoted “enlistment, the purchase of war bonds, and the conservation 
of scarce resources.”36  To drive his point home, Justice Alito emphasizes that, 
although the World War II posters clearly “expressed a viewpoint . . . the First 
Amendment did not demand that the Government balance the message of these 
posters by producing and distributing posters encouraging Americans to refrain 
from engaging in these activities.”37  Nevertheless, he adds a stern warning 
regarding the necessity of exercising “great caution before extending our 
government speech precedents.”38  
In holding that registered trademarks cannot be characterized as a form of 
government speech, he first notes that the Government neither originates an 
applicant’s mark nor edits it.39  Rather, he emphasizes that none of the § 2 bars 
to registration—except the disparagement clause—permits disqualification for 
registration “based on the viewpoint that it appears to express.”40  “Instead, if the 
mark meets the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-neutral requirements, registration is 
mandatory.”41  In a somewhat chastising tone, he bluntly asserts, “[i]n light of all 
this, it is far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark is 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Id. at 1757.  For a discussion of the First Amendment’s relationship to the government speech 
doctrine, see, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.4, at 634–43. 
 35 137 S. Ct. at 1757. 
 36 Id. at 1758. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (“But while the government-speech doctrine is important—indeed, essential—it is a 
doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse.  If private speech could be passed off as 
government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval, government could silence or 
muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.  For this reason, we must exercise great caution 
before extending our government-speech precedents.”). 
 39 Id. at 1748 (“The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and it does not edit 
marks submitted for registration.”).  The court below also held that trademarks were not 
government speech.  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Trademarks are not 
understood to convey a government message or carry a government endorsement.”).  In fact, Judge 
Moore bluntly stated, “[t]his argument is meritless.”  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
 40 137 S. Ct. at 1758. 
 41 Id. 
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government speech.”42  Indeed, the PTO itself has previously held “that 
registration does not constitute approval of a mark.”43  
The opinion then discusses three prominent cases where the Court previously 
held that the speech in question was, in fact, correctly labeled as government 
speech—and thus not subject to First Amendment scrutiny44—but directly 
asserts, “[n]one of our government speech cases even remotely supports the idea 
that registered trademarks are government speech.”45  The Court first looks at 
the Johanns case, which is probably the easiest to comprehend.46  The advertising 
in question was created pursuant to a federal statute and government departments 
and employees directly participated in the drafting of the advertisements.47  
Summum involved the display of monuments in a public city park.48  There, the 
Court articulated specific factors that led it to conclude the selection of 
monuments for display in the public city park should be categorized as 
government speech.49  But summarizing his analysis of the Summum factors as 
they apply to registered trademarks, Justice Alito concludes:  
Trademarks share none of these characteristics.  Trademarks have 
not traditionally been used to convey a Government message.  
With the exception of the enforcement of 15 U. S. C. § 1052(a), 
the viewpoint expressed by a mark has not played a role in the 
decision whether to place it on the principal register.  And there is 
no evidence that the public associates the contents of trademarks 
with the Federal Government.50  
He next addresses Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
characterizing that case as probably representing “the outer bounds of the 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Id.  This holding vindicates Judge Moore’s view expressed in her “additional views.” See In re 
Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 574 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  It also overrules Judge Lee’s decision in Pro-Football, Inc. 
v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 457 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“[T]he federal trademark registration 
program is government speech and is thus exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 43 137 S. Ct. at 1759 (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1216, 1220 n.3 
(T.T.A.B. 1993)). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1759. 
 47 Id.  For an overview and discussion of Johanns, see, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, 
§ 16.4, at 639. 
 48 137 S. Ct. at 1759.  For a discussion of Summum, see, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, 
§ 16.4, at 634–36. 
 49 137 S. Ct. at 1759–60. See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 758–63 (analyzing the Summum factors and 
their relationship to federal trademark registration). 
 50 137 S. Ct. at 1760.  See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 762 (When, analyzing how the factors 
articulated in Walker—derived from Summum—apply to federal trademark registration, “[r]egistered 
trademarks share none of these characteristics that evince messages conveyed on behalf of the 
government”).  
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government speech doctrine.”51  In Walker, the Court held that the messages 
communicated on specialty license plates made by the Texas Department of 
Motor Vehicles were not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, because the 
messages were government speech.52  After noting those factors “distilled from 
Summum,” Justice Alito nevertheless distinguishes Walker, concluding that, “none 
of these factors are present in this case.”53 
Holding that Johanns, Summum, and Walker are “vastly different” from “the 
federal registration of trademarks,” he reasons that the opposite conclusion 
“would constitute a huge and dangerous extension of the government speech 
doctrine.”54  He specifically warns that if trademark registration were considered 
government speech—and therefore not subject to First Amendment scrutiny—
there would be nothing to prevent the same analysis from applying to copyright 
registration.55  He emphasizes that, even though the brevity of trademarks 
necessarily limits their ability to express ideas, nevertheless, “powerful messages 
can sometimes be conveyed in just a few words.”56  He succinctly concludes, 
“[t]rademarks are private, not government speech.”57  
In Part III.B, Justice Alito explains why he believes that federal trademark 
registration is not a government subsidy.58  He briefly states that, as a rule, 
“government is not required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to 
promote.”59  But he distinguishes the cases cited for support by the Government, 
stating, “[u]nlike the present case, the decisions on which the Government relies 
all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent.”60  He points out, in particular, 
that the opposite is true in the case of federal trademark registration—far from 
receiving payment for using the service, trademark applicants must pay an 
application fee and ongoing maintenance additional fees.61  Justice Alito adds that 
the non-monetary benefits derived from federal registration simply do not rise to 
                                                                                                                   
 51 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
 52 Id. (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015)).  
 53 Id.  See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 755–65 (analyzing Walker and Summum). 
 54 137 S. Ct. at 1760.  See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 764 (“Both the monuments in Summum and 
the license plates in Walker are very different from trademarks registered on the Principal Register.  
Trademarks registered on the Principal Register do not necessarily convey messages or images that 
the United States Government wants to project.”).  
 55 137 S. Ct. at 1760.  See VerSteeg, supra note 4, at 765–67 (drawing analogies to Copyright 
registration); id. at 766 (“Imagine for a moment the reaction if Congress were to attempt to prevent 
registration of copyright for works that ‘may disparage persons, institutions, or beliefs.’  It seems 
quite certain that such a statute would fail First Amendment scrutiny.”); id. at 767 (“Refusing to 
register trademarks that ‘may disparage’ is an overbroad and vague restriction—throwing 
Trademark law out of balance with Copyright—that the First Amendment simply cannot 
countenance.”). 
 56 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 1760–62. 
 59 Id. at 1761. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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the level of being categorized as a subsidy any more than the benefits derived by 
the public from other government programs and services, such as police, fire 
fighters, the court system, public parks, highways, copyright and patent 
registration, land records, commercial filings, and a variety of government 
licensing functions, such as driver’s licenses, motor vehicle registrations, as well 
as hunting, fishing, and boating permits.62  
In Part III.C, Justice Alito responds to the Government’s novel argument that 
federal trademark registration should be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny 
because it constitutes a special type of “government-program.”63  Justice Alito 
takes the position that the Government’s proposed “new doctrine that would 
apply to ‘government-program’ cases, which “simply merges our government-
speech cases and . . . subsidy cases in an attempt to construct a broader doctrine 
that can be applied to the registration of trademarks.”64  Although he summarizes 
the cases cited by the Government in support of its new “government-program” 
theory, Justice Alito ultimately dismisses the theory, partly because those cases 
involve facts “far removed from the registration of trademarks.”65 
Justice Alito takes a metaphorical detour in the latter portion of Part III.C.  
He suggests that the “limited public forum” cases are “[p]otentially more 
analogous” to the case at bar than are the cases that the Government had cited 
for its “government-program” theory.66  But he quickly concludes, “even in such 
cases, what we have termed ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden.”67  At this 
juncture, he devotes two paragraphs to discuss the jurisprudence of viewpoint 
discrimination.68  In sum, he notes the seriousness of the First Amendment’s role 
as a check on viewpoint discrimination in general.69  He likewise stresses the 
principle itself, “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, 
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”70  He concludes 
this part of the opinion, asserting that, “the disparagement clause cannot be saved 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Id.  The Court of Appeals also held that federal trademark registration is not a government 
subsidy.  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1348–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 63 137 S. Ct. at 1761–63. 
 64 Id. at 1761–62. 
 65 Id. at 1762. 
 66 Id. at 1763.  See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 763 (“rather than classifying federal trademark 
registration as “government-speech,” it might be more appropriate to classify it either as a “public 
forum,” “non-public forum,” or, as Justice Alito’s dissent in Walker suggested for the Texas 
specialty license plates, federal trademark registration might be classified as a “limited public 
forum.”).  For a general discussion of the public forum doctrine, see e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 2, §§ 16.27–16.28, at 737–56.  
 67 137 S. Ct. at 1763. 
 68 Id.  In the opinion below, the CAFC held that the disparagement clause constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination.  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government regulation at 
issue amounts to viewpoint discrimination. . . .”). 
 69 137 S. Ct. at 1763. 
 70 Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
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by analyzing it as a type of government program in which some content- and 
speaker-based restrictions are permitted.”71 
Part IV of the opinion addresses the question of whether trademarks should 
be classified as commercial speech, and therefore analyzed under the lower-level 
degree of First Amendment scrutiny established by the Court in Central Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.72  Briefly stated, if trademarks are 
classified as commercial speech, § 2(a)’s disparagement clause would be subject 
to intermediate scrutiny, using the Central Hudson test; whereas if trademarks are 
not classified as commercial speech, then the disparagement clause would be 
subject to the more rigorous standard of strict scrutiny.73  But having posed the 
question, Justice Alito dodges it: “We need not resolve this debate . . . because 
the disparagement clause cannot withstand even Central Hudson review.”74  He 
then explains the Central Hudson test and applies it to the disparagement clause.75  
In this process, Justice Alito identifies the Government’s alleged interests (in 
support of upholding the constitutionality of the disparagement clause) as: (1) 
prevention of “speech expressing ideas that offend,” and (2) protection of “the 
orderly flow of commerce.”76  Nevertheless, without directly coming to a legal 
conclusion regarding the substantiality of those interests,77 Alito holds that the 
disparagement clause is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve those 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Id. 
 72 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  For an overview and discussion of Central Hudson, see e.g., NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.12, at 680–82. 
 73 137 S. Ct. at 1764.  In the opinion below, the CAFC, en banc, held that the disparagement 
clause conflicted with the Free Speech clause using strict scrutiny.  In re Tam, 808 F3d 1321, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government regulation at issue amounts to viewpoint discrimination, and 
under the strict scrutiny review appropriate for government regulation of message or viewpoint, we 
conclude that the disparagement proscription of § 2(a) is unconstitutional.”). 
 74 137 S. Ct. at 1763. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (Justice Powell remarked 
that the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech “will not always be easy to 
draw.”).  For an additional perspective on this issue and the case Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 99 
S. Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004), see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.12, at 697 (“In 
upholding the ban on trade names the majority refrained from establishing rigid rules for the 
regulation of commercial speech.”).  The court below also held that the disparagement clause fails 
to pass muster under the commercial speech analysis, applying the Central Hudson test.  In re Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 75 137 S. Ct. at 1763–64. See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 748–55 (discussing application of the 
Central Hudson test to the disparagement clause). 
 76 137 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 77 The Central Hudson test requires that in order to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, the 
Government’s interest in achieving its goal must be “substantial.”  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 582 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Judge Moore’s “Additional Views,” arguing that 
“The government has not put forth any substantial interests that would justify § 2(a)’s bar against 
disparaging marks.”); In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1355–57 (holding that none of the government’s 
alleged interests were substantial).   
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interests.78  “[I]t goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest[s] 
asserted.”79  In short he characterizes it as “far too broad.”80 
3.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion.  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion—
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—aligns itself with Parts I, II, 
and III.A of Justice Alito’s opinion.  According to Justice Kennedy, he is going 
to the trouble of writing separately to flesh out “in greater detail why the First 
Amendment’s protections against viewpoint discrimination apply to the 
trademark here.”81  In addition, Justice Kennedy contends “that the viewpoint 
discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any extended treatment of other 
questions raised by the parties.”82   
Like Justice Alito’s discussion of viewpoint discrimination, Justice Kennedy 
begins by examining the fundamental tenets of the doctrine.  He notes that 
viewpoint discrimination is actually a subspecies of content discrimination.83  He 
next explains that, because the disparagement clause makes it possible for “an 
applicant . . . [to] register a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one,” it 
“thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds 
offensive.”84  Justice Kennedy reasons, therefore, that “[t]his is the essence of 
viewpoint discrimination.”85  One-by-one he refutes the Government’s 
                                                                                                                   
 78 137 S. Ct. at 1764. For more on the Central Hudson “narrowly tailored” requirement of see e.g., 
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.12, at 682.  See also VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 753–55 
(examining this element of the Central Hudson test, and arguing: “At best, § 2(a) merely indirectly 
curbs disparaging trademarks because it simply bans registration of them; it does not categorically 
prohibit their use.  In order for § 2(a) to comport with the First Amendment, the government needs 
to show that § 2(a) is narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s goals” and concluding, “The 
phrase ‘may disparage’ is too broad and vague to possibly be considered ‘narrowly tailored.’ ”); id. 
at 737–48 (analyzing in detail why the vague and overbroad words “may” and “disparage” render 
the disparagement clause insufficiently narrowly tailored to promote a substantial government 
objective); id. at 707 (recounting Judge Moore’s view that trademarks should be classified as 
commercial speech).  Interestingly, the court below did not reach the “narrowly tailored” issue.  See 
VerSteeg, supra note 2, at 725 (“Judge Moore does not even analyze whether § 2(a) directly and 
materially advances the government’s interests and is narrowly tailored to accomplish them.”). 
 79 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1766 (“A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint is an ‘egregious form of content 
discrimination,’ which is presumptively unconstitutional.”). 
 84 Id.  See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 734 (“It is clear that the ‘may disparage’ prohibition of § 2(a) 
is a content-based or viewpoint-based restriction. Consider the paradigmatic example of Native 
American names and imagery.  Indian logos, names, and even ceremonial dances are permitted to 
show honor, tradition, and respect but not allowed if a substantial composite of Native Americans 
sues and complains that they are disparaging.” (footnote omitted)).  See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 2, § 16.1, at 623, discussing cases involving flag desecration (“Indeed, these laws did not 
ban all burning of flags; these laws allowed a flag to be burned in a respectful manner as a means 
of disposing of a used flag.  Because laws banning desecration of the flag involve symbolic speech 
and are not content related, the court invalidated them.”).  For more about symbolic speech, see 
infra Part II.C. 
 85 137 S. Ct. at 1766. 
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arguments that the clause is viewpoint neutral, and explains that using “the 
reaction of the speaker’s audience” [i.e., the perceptions of the putatively 
disparaged group of persons] as a litmus test for application of the disparagement 
clause poses a threat.86  “The danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the 
government is attempting to remove certain ideas and perspectives from the 
broader debate.”87 
Like Justice Alito’s opinion, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence also addresses the 
issue of whether trademarks should be classified as commercial speech, resulting 
in application of the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.  In addition, 
like Justice Alito, Kennedy acknowledges the question of “whether trademark 
registration should be considered a federal subsidy.”88  In Justice Kennedy’s view, 
the mere fact that the disparagement clause itself constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination alone “necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny.”89  He expressly 
declares that, “commercial speech is no exception.”90  He notes that trademarks 
play an important role in modern “everyday life,” and concludes that the effect 
of the disparagement clause’s nullification of trademark registration based on 
viewpoint discrimination “in this context . . . permit[s] Government 
censorship.”91 
Before closing, Justice Kennedy remarks that “confusing or misleading” 
marks may still be refused registration pursuant to other provisions of the 
Lanham Act,92 and that product labeling and other consumer protection 
requirements are not at issue.93  He reminds us that “[t]he central purpose of 
trademark registration is to facilitate source identification,” and that the putatively 
disparaging nature of marks “bears no plausible relation to that goal.”94  He 
eloquently sums up: 
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some 
portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting 
views to the detriment of all.  The First Amendment does not 
entrust that power to the government’s benevolence.  Instead, our 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 1767. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (“[T]o the extent that trademarks qualify as commercial speech, they are an example of why 
that term or category does not serve as a blanket exemption from the First Amendment’s 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality.”). 
 91 Id. at 1768. See also Part IV infra regarding the relevance of Justice Kennedy’s observation here 
to a workable definition for “immoral” and “scandalous matter.” 
 92 137 S. Ct. at 1768.  See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 751 (explaining that “the majority of reasons 
for refusal to register in § 2 have the effect of preventing registration of false or misleading 
advertising”).  
 93 Id. 
 94 137 S. Ct. at 1769. 
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reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open 
discussion in a democratic society.95 
4.  Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion.  Justice Thomas wrote a concurring 
opinion as well.  His brief concurrence simply stresses two points.  First, he states 
that his reason for not joining Part II of the Court’s opinion is that Tam had not 
argued that the disparagement clause fails to reach non-juristic persons (e.g., racial 
and ethnic groups) when the case was before the TTAB or CAFC.  Hence he 
says that he perceives “no reason to address” that issue.96  Second, he reaffirms 
his belief that strict scrutiny should always apply to situations where “the 
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it 
conveys. . . .”97  But he “join[s] Part IV of Justice Alito’s opinion because it 
correctly concludes that the disparagement clause . . . is unconstitutional even 
under the less stringent test announced in Central Hudson.”98  
C.  IMMEDIATE IMPACT 
The Tam decision is likely to affect the nature of trademark registrations in 
the United States for many years to come.  One of the most significant and 
immediate results of the Tam decision occurred within days after the opinion was 
released.  On June 21, 2017, attorneys for Pro-Football asked the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals to “reverse the judgment of the district court, vacate the district 
court’s order directing the PTO to schedule cancellation of Pro Football’s 
trademark registrations [of the Washington Redskins football team,] and remand 
the case with instructions to grant summary judgment to Pro-Football.”99  But, 
beyond the direct effect that the opinion will have on the Slants band and the 
Redskins football team, more generally speaking, PTO trademark examining 
attorneys will no longer have discretion to impose their own opinions to prohibit 
registration of marks that might bruise the feelings of groups and individuals, using 
the disparagement clause.  In addition, individuals and groups who suffer such 
bruised feelings will no longer be capable of using § 2(a) as a weapon to oppose 
and cancel the registrations of marks that they deem offensive to them.100  
By freeing up the marketplace in this manner, trademark applicants will select 
their trademarks in a climate where they will be at liberty to pick marks that may, 
in fact, offend persons, institutions, or beliefs.  But, presumably, they will do so 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Letter from Lisa S. Blatt, Counsel for Pro-Football to Patricia S. Conner, Clerk of the Court. 
 100 See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (opposition); 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (cancellation).  See infra Part IV, which 
suggests that an appropriate definition of “immoral” and “scandalous matter” may provide a means 
to prevent registration of some marks that would fall outside the scope of the protections of the 
First Amendment. 
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at their peril.  They will simply run the risk that their disparaging marks will create 
negative criticism and rally opponents to boycott their products or services.  
Public and consumer opinion will drive the marketplace rather than an examining 
attorney’s rejection.  As long as their adopted marks do not fall into the category 
of unprotected speech101 and as long as their marks are not otherwise disqualified 
under the other of subsections of § 2, which define the metes and bounds of valid 
trademarks,102 trademark applicants may choose marks that some will find 
distasteful and offensive.  But, according to Matal v. Tam, that is the nature of 
First Amendment freedom.103 
Trademarks are the names and symbols by which sellers identify and 
distinguish their goods and services from those of others.104  The names and 
symbols provide consumers information with which they can make choices.  
Some trademark owners have even chosen names that they know lack consumer 
appeal, and yet have stuck with such names.  Recall for instance the admission by 
the Smucker’s Corporation in its advertising which stated: “With a name like 
Smucker’s it has to be good.”105  Presumably, those who wish to sell goods or 
services take into account multiple factors when selecting trademarks.  Those 
who wish to “start from scratch,” so to speak, may coin a word or symbol by 
selecting a fanciful mark.106  Those who choose arbitrary marks typically select 
                                                                                                                   
 101 See infra Part IV. 
 102 137 S. Ct. at 1763–65.  Part IV briefly considers some of the issues raised by In re Brunetti, 
877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and focuses, in part, on defining the words “immoral” and 
“scandalous” in a way to prohibit registration of marks that cross the line separating “may 
disparage” and matter that is either “unprotected” by the First Amendment or within the scope 
permissible under the reasoning of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 103 See infra Part III.B. 
 104 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9.  DEFINITIONS OF 
TRADEMARK AND SERVICE MARK (AM. LAW INST. XXXX) (“A trademark is a word, name, symbol, 
device, or other designation, or a combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person’s 
goods or services and that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and 
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.  A service mark is a trademark that is used 
in connection with services.”).  The Lanham Act defines “trademark” as including “any word, name 
symbol or device . . . [used] to identify and distinguish . . . goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Interestingly, 
given that many trademarks are, in fact, symbolic in a non-linguistic sense, such marks may, for 
purposes of First Amendment analysis, come within the scope of what the Court has called 
“symbolic speech.”  For a discussion of symbolic speech and its relationship to the First 
Amendment, see, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 621–24; id. § 16.29, at 756–58 
(discussing several important symbolic speech cases, such as United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968)  (burning draft cards), Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(black armbands worn by high school students to protest the war in Vietnam, and Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag desecration)). 
 105 The J.M. Smucker Company owns United States Trademark Registration Numbers 850,303 
and 3,082,687 for the mark “WITH A NAME LIKE SMUCKER’S IT HAS TO BE GOOD,” 
which mark incorporates the SMUCKER’S trademark in its entirety.  The J.M. Smucker Company 
v. The Weston Firm, P.C., 2013 WL 875794, Trial Pleading No. 5:13-cv-448 (N.D. Ohio 2013).  
 106 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS §§ 11:8, 11:15 (“Fanciful marks consist of ‘coined’ words 
that have been invented or selected for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark.” (footnote 
17
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words or symbols that they believe have some type of positive association in 
consumers’ minds.107  Those who pick suggestive marks typically do so because 
they hope that consumers will appreciate the subtle, often nuanced, humor and 
cleverness that is part and parcel of the power of suggestion.108  Those who decide 
to use descriptive marks usually do so in an effort to be direct and forthright with 
consumers to convey the ingredients and qualities of what they are offering to 
the public.109  
But whether sellers select a fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, or descriptive mark, 
they all have one thing in common.  They all choose a mark whose appearance, 
sound, or meaning they think will appeal in some way to their targeted consumers.  
Occasionally, a seller misjudges his audience, but presumably, most sellers do 
their best to maximize positive consumer associations between their chosen 
trademarks and their goods or services.  So, when a seller picks a mark that some 
segment of the population considers offensive or disparaging to them, their 
institutions, or their beliefs, presumably the seller risks losing sales to that 
segment of the population and others who sympathize with those who perceive 
that disparagement.  Essentially the Tam decision gives such sellers sufficient rope 
to hang themselves in this manner.110  
                                                                                                                   
omitted)); see also Ashley Furniture Indus. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 107 See MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 11:11 (“Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, 
pictures, etc., that are in common use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, 
neither suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 108 See id. § 11:67 (“The more imagination that is required on the potential customer’s part to get 
some direct description of the product from the designation, the more likely the designation is 
suggestive, not descriptive.” (footnote omitted)); id. § 11:66 (“The descriptive-suggestive borderline 
is hardly a clear one.  Its exact location in any give situation is hazy and only subjectively definable.”).  
See also id. § 11:62.  
 109 See id. § 11:16 (explaining that courts commonly state that a putative mark is “descriptive” if 
it immediately relates the nature, contents, or characteristics of its associated product).  Also note 
that surnames, technically speaking, frequently are descriptive, because a surname used as a mark 
typically (though not categorically) describes the producer or endorser of a product or service.  See 
also TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1211 Refusal on Basis of Surname.  See, 
e.g., Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, 569 F.2d. 731 (2d Cir. 1978); Zobmondo Entm’t v. 
Falls Media, 602 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2010); Sec. Ctr. v. First Nat’l Sec. Ctrs., 750 F.2d 1295 (5th 
Cir. 1985); Peaceable Planet v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The reluctance to allow 
personal names to be used as trademarks reflects valid concerns. . . . One of the concerns is a 
reluctance to forbid a person to use his own name in his own business.”); In re Quadrillion Publ’g 
Ltd., 2000 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 562, 563 (Aug. 9, 2000) (“The Trademark Examining Attorney has 
refused registration under Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4), on the 
ground that applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname.  We affirm the refusal to register.”); In 
re Joint-Stock Company “Baik,” 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1925 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (the TTAB held 
that “BAIK” was a rare surname and thus not primarily merely a surname.  In his concurring 
opinion, Judge Seeherman’s stated, “if a term does not have the ‘look and feel’ of a surname, it 
should not be refused registration even if there is evidence to show that it is, in fact, a surname”). 
 110 See JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 147 (1973) (“[Llewellyn regarded 
laymen’s behavior as ‘part of the law’ and he also included ‘in the field of law’ not only the behavior 
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III.  FOUNDATIONS OF TRADEMARK LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  CORE TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES 
As was mentioned, early in his opinion, Justice Alito refers to the historical 
origins of trademark law.111  Thus, Part III of this Article explores a number of 
significant principles and relationships from those origins in order to assess 
whether they support the disparagement clause. 
1.  Trademarks as Property.  Modern trademark law recognizes that trademarks 
are a form of property, which sellers acquire by using a mark in commerce.112  
Thus, when Simon Tam and his band decided to call themselves The Slants, they 
acquired federal trademark rights in that name once they used it in a manner 
sufficient to constitute interstate commerce.  Courts have deemed trademarks as 
a type of property at least since the mid-fifteenth century.113   
                                                                                                                   
of officials, their practices, and their contacts with laymen but, also ‘sets of accepted formulae which 
judges recite, seek light from, try to follow, . . . various persons’ ideas of what the law is; and 
especially their views of what it or some part of it ought to accomplish. . . .  Farther from the center 
lies legal and social philosophy . . . Part of law, in many aspects, is all of society, and all of man in 
society.’ ” (quoting LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 40–41 (1962))). 
 111 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 112 See generally Central Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Blue 
Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The gist of trademark rights is 
actual use in trade.”); Thoroughbred Legends, LLC v. Walt Disney Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19960m, at *11 n.13 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2008) (“A plaintiff in a trademark infringement lawsuit 
must not only show that it used its mark in commerce, but also that it used the mark as a trademark, 
whether the mark is registered or not.” (citation omitted)); In re Dell Inc., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1725 (T.T.A.B. 2004); In re Gastown, Inc., 326 F.2d 780 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, 
S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (“ ‘Use’ is neither a glitch in the Lanham Act nor a historical 
relic.  By insisting that firms use marks to obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs 
from reserving brand names in order to make their rivals’ marketing more costly.”); White v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 1997 WL 76957, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Section 45 of the Act defines 
the term ‘use in commerce’ to mean ‘the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, 
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.’  15 U.S.C. § 1127.  The ‘ordinary course of trade’ 
requirement is the result of the amendments to the Act made by the Trademark Law Revision Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (‘Revision Act’).  The Revision Act provided for a 
new concept of trademark use than that which had been employed in the past.  Prior to the Revision 
Act’s effective date of November 16, 1989, ‘token’ use of a trademark was enough for registration 
purposes.  Under the current law, applicants for registration can file either based on use or intent 
to use the mark.  Therefore, the Revision Act eliminated the necessity for a token use system to 
reserve a mark, and instituted the requirement that the use must be in the ‘ordinary course of trade.’  
15 U.S.C. § 1127.”).  See also Tam, 582 U.S. ___, (2017) Opinion of Alito, J. slip op. at 3 (“Under 
the Lanham Act, trademarks that are “used in commerce” may be placed on the “principal register,” 
that is, they may be federally registered.” (citing 15 U. S. C. § 1051(a)(1)). 
 113 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 109 (“The importance of the case of the mark of the Double 
Crescent is twofold in that it shows (i) that by 1452 the cutler’s mark had become of sufficient value 
to be the subject of litigation for its restoration and (2) that the notion of property in a mark had 
developed so far that the widow of the owner of a mark, as long as she remained in business, was 
entitled to retain the use of the mark (marquam suam pristinam), even subsequent to her remarriage.” 
(footnote omitted)).  See also Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. 
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Whether trade-marks are accurately called property or not, it is 
clear that some of the rights that are incident to property do attach 
to them; and therefore . . . it may be convenient to speak of trade-
marks as “property,” as a short way of expressing a limited truth 
that requires ampler means for a complete and accurate 
statement. . . .”114  
As a form of property, modern trademark owners consider their marks as a 
distinct and important business asset.  Interestingly, the law was actually rather 
slow to recognize trademarks as assets.  Schechter identifies this development as 
having occurred in the seventeenth century.115 Many ancient legal systems 
recognized that legal rights to property may originate by means of possession and 
                                                                                                                   
L. REV. 29, 36 (1910) (describing a will dated July 1574, Rogers states: “That these symbols were 
regarded as valuable property is evident. . . .”); GRANT, supra note 2, at 110 (“The study of our legal 
past is helpful to lawyers and judges and legislators in the same way that the study of recorded 
games is helpful to a chess player.  But the principal lesson to be drawn from our study is that the 
part of wisdom is to keep our theories open-ended, our assumptions tentative, our reactions 
flexible.   We must act, we must decide, we must go this way or that.  Like the blind men dealing 
with the elephant, we must erect hypotheses on the basis of inadequate evidence.  That does no 
harm—at all events it is the human condition from which we will not escape—so long as we do 
not delude ourselves into thinking that we have finally seen our elephant whole.”). 
 114 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 156.  See also id. at 171 (“Using the term property in its modern 
legal sense, viz., as a right having a pecuniary value which will be protected by the legal agencies of 
society, rights in or pertaining to trade-marks may be classified as property.”); id. (“However, the 
classification of trade-marks as property is not essential to their protection since equity should, in 
any event, prevent the destruction or impairment of the probable expectancy of trade or custom, 
of which the trade-mark is a symbol as well as a creative factor.”  See also Paster, supra note 15, at 
566 (“In the case of Millington v. Fox the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham (without citing any 
authorities and ignoring Blanchard v. Hill) held that equity would enjoin trade-mark infringement 
even though such infringement was without intent to defraud and in ignorance of plaintiff’s 
ownership of the trademark involved.  This decision led by obvious deduction to the recognition 
of a right of property arising from the use of a trademark. 
 
Thereafter protection of trademarks in 
equity became based upon a theory of property rights.” (citing Millington v. Fox, (1838) 3 Myl & 
Cr 338, and T.A. Blanco White, Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, at 4 (9th ed. 1966))); 
Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14  LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 173, 182 (1949) (“The word ‘property’ as applied to trade-marks * * * is an unanalyzed 
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some 
rudimentary requirements of good faith.” (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes in Dupont v. Masland 
(244 U. S. 100, 102))).  See, e.g., International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 
F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (“A trademark is, of course, a form of business property.  See 
MCCARTHY, supra note 106, §§ 2:6–2:7.  But the ‘property right’ or protection accorded a trademark 
owner can only be understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes.  A trademark 
owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion as to who 
produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner’s goods.”). 
 115 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 101 (“[I]n the seventeenth century, the modern concept of a 
trade-mark as an asset of value begins to appear.”).  See also id. at 122–23 (“[W]hile the affixing of 
that mark may have worked to the detriment of its user, since thereby defective workmanship could 
be traced and punished, long before the use of marks ceased to be compulsory, their users began 
to [123] realize the possibility of those marks as an asset, i.e., as a symbol of good-will.”). 
20
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use.116  Blackstone specifically mentions “occupation,” which the Romans called 
“occupatio,” as a conventional means of acquiring ownership of property.117  Yet, 
as Schechter acknowledges, “[i]t is worthy of note that the second volume of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, which appeared in 1766, contains no reference 
whatsoever to the subject of trade-marks in his discussion (Bk. II, Chap. XXVI) 
of ‘Titles to Things Personal by Occupancy,’ although among the ‘things 
personal’ there enumerated are patents and copyrights.”118  But Blackstone 
emphasizes the paramount importance of property in the British system of the 
eighteenth century, stating, “The third absolute right, inherent in every 
Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and 
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by 
the laws of the land.”119  
Since this section of the Article examines the relationship between the 
foundations of legal acquisition of property and trademarks, one important point 
to emphasize is that, like much legal acquisition of property, acquisition of 
trademark rights begins with the use of the trademark.120  The trademark 
registration process does not create trademark rights per se, but federal trademark 
registration adds significant benefits to a trademark owner’s layers of legal 
protection.121 Registration of trademarks has its roots in the Middle Ages. Some 
of the guilds required merchants and craftsmen to register their proprietary 
marks.122  Initially, registration with the guild was required so that consumers and 
                                                                                                                   
 116 See, e.g., J.A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 138 (1976) (“[P]osession did in fact have 
considerable connexion with ownership. . . .”); id. at 157–63 (explaining the relationship between 
possessio and usucapio); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 107–15, 122–30 
(1972). 
 117 * WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 205 (Forward by Richard J. Goldstone, 2009 
American Bar Association). According to Blackstone, title by occupancy vests as follows: 
“[W]hatever moveables are found upon the surface of the earth, or in the sea, and are unclaimed 
by any owner, are supposed to be abandoned by the last proprietor; and therefore belong, as in a 
state of nature, to the first occupant or fortunate finder.”  See also THOMAS, supra note 116, at 166–
68; NICHOLAS, supra note 116, at 130–36. 
 118 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 129 (footnote omitted).  See also Paster, supra note 15, at 564 
(“Giles Jacob in 1723 in his New Law Dictionary says that a ‘mark of goods . . . is what ascertains 
the Property or Goodness thereof &c.  And if one Man shall use the Mark of another, to the intent 
to do him Damage, Action upon the Case lieth. 2 Cro. 471.’  The second volume of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (1766) contains no reference whatever to the subject of trademarks in his discussion 
(Book II, Ch.XXVI) of ‘Titles of Things Personal by Occupancy’ although among the ‘things 
personal’ there enumerated are patents and copyrights.”). 
 119 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 12. 
 120 See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The gist of 
trademark rights is actual use in trade.”). 
 121 See Tam, 582 U.S. ___, (2017) Opinion of Alito, J. slip op. at 5; See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 
682. 
 122 See generally SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 47–63.  See also L.E. Daniels, The History of The Trade-
Mark, 7 BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION 239, 248 (1911) (“[In 
Medieval Europe,] “the trade-mark seems to have been imposed by the gild upon all goods 
produced by its members, the mark both showing the origin of the goods and acting as a stamp to 
21
VerSteeg: Historical Perspectives & Reflections on "Matal v. Tam" and the F
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:41 PM 
130  J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:109 
competitors would be able to identify the manufacturer of a product in the event 
that the product later proved substandard, injurious, or otherwise defective.123  It 
was much later that any type of registry was established for the purpose of 
securing or strengthening a mark owner’s rights.124  “It was not until 1875 . . . that 
the first British trade-mark registration statute was enacted.  In 1870 the first 
United States statute providing for the registration of marks was passed and, this 
statute being held unconstitutional, a similar one was re-enacted with the 
objectionable features eliminated in 1876.”125  
Nevertheless, registration aimed at securing and strengthening rights is a vital 
aspect of the Tam case.  To a large degree what triggers application of First 
Amendment principles in the Tam litigation is that, by denying federal registration 
for a mark that “may disparage,” the government chills a mark owner’s freedom 
of speech, because a putative applicant is far less likely to select a mark and apply 
for federal registration of a mark if she fears that the PTO will deny registration, 
based on the viewpoint of the message (i.e., the allegedly disparaging nature) of 
the mark selected.126  And that is one of the principal reasons why the CAFC, in 
its opinion below, held that the Government’s denial of those benefits to marks 
that “may” cause disparagement is unconstitutional.127  
                                                                                                                   
guarantee quality.”); Paster, supra note 15, at 556 (“As a rule, when one became a master craftsmen, 
he was required to choose a mark, obliged to use it on all goods he produced, and to retain it his 
entire life.  Use of a mark was obligatory, part of the duty to the community, and demanded by the 
strict social order of craft guilds of the Middle Ages.” (footnote omitted)); Abraham S. Greenberg, 
The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y, 876, 881 (1951) (“Guild regulations 
required every product of a member craftsman to display the unique mark of the guild, and, in 
addition, the special recorded brand or trade-mark of the individual artisan.”); id. at 885 (“In 1619 
the gold beaters’ guild at Nurnberg established a compulsory trade-mark register for the purpose 
of recording the names of all master workmen and their respective trade-marks.  This register now 
is preserved among the official archives of the city.”). 
 123 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 47 (“Their expressed purpose was to facilitate the tracing of 
‘false’ or defective wares and the punishment of the offending craftsmen.”).  See also Sidney A. 
Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 THE TRADEMARK REPORTER 265, 280 (1975) 
(“[T]he guild marks which were the principal development of the mediaeval period very largely 
were compulsory marks whose primary purpose was to fix the blame for inferior workmanship.”); 
Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor Company, 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (1989) (“[T]he 
trademark as we know it today most likely originated with the medieval guilds of Europe, who often 
required members to identify their products ‘to facilitate the tracing of ‘false’ or defective wares 
and the punishment of the offending craftsman.’ ” (quoting Schechter)). 
 124 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 140. 
 125 Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Paster, supra note 15, at 568 (“It was not until 1875 that the 
ignorance and indifference of Parliament in this matter of registration was finally overcome and the 
first British trademark registration statute enacted.  In 1870 the first United States statute providing 
for the registration of trademarks was passed, that statute being held unconstitutional.  A similar 
statute was reenacted in 1876 with the objectionable features of the earlier law eliminated.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 126 See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 722. 
 127 See id. (“According to the court, when a governmental ‘denial of a benefit would chill exercise 
of the constitutional right’ of freedom of speech, that denial violates the First Amendment.  ‘The 
general principle is clear: “Lawmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening its 
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For millennia, sellers have used names, letters, and other symbols to signify 
to potential buyers the source of goods and services.  The ancient Greeks 
stamped names and symbols on amphora when shipping wine and oil.128  The 
Roman city of Pompeii has ample evidence of shopkeepers, who wrote their 
names on the doors and gates that served as entryways for their business 
establishments.129  By the time of Sir William Blackstone in the mid-1700’s, 
English law had begun forging foundational principles regarding what was fair 
and otherwise appropriate for sellers to use as trademarks.  In particular, 
Blackstone notes that corporations were required to designate a company name 
for legal purposes: “When a corporation is erected, a name must be given to it; 
                                                                                                                   
utterance than by censoring its content.” ’  And the court explicitly recognized that the ‘may 
disparage’ prohibition poses precisely this type of Sword of Damocles situation: ‘Denial of these 
benefits creates a serious disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem offensive 
or disparaging.’ ” (footnotes omitted)). 
 128 SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 15, at 20.  For more regarding the use of 
such marks in ancient Greece, see e.g., Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 THE TRADE 
MARK REPORTER 127, 132 (1955) (“In the best period of Greek Art, from about 400 B.C. onwards, 
many vases, jars and other pottery objects were marked in various ways; potters’, painters’ and 
official marks are all known.”); Paster, supra note 15, at 553 (“Greek pottery commonly displays 
pictures representing the adventures of classical heroes, but there also appears a mark on the base 
of the pots believed to signify the origin of the product.  Few examples of Grecian sculpture lack 
the inscription of the sculptor’s name.  On decorated pieces, the name of the decorator is also 
included.  Kohler reports that beside the maker’s name, cup handles for the use at the Ceramicus 
of Athens often displayed abstract trademarks in the form of figures of Mercury’s staffs, oil jugs, 
bees and lions’ heads.” (footnotes omitted)); Greenberg, supra note 122, at 878 (“A study of the 
ancient Greek potters’ creations (lamps, vases, cups, amphora) revealed pictorial trade-marks of 
considerable fancy.  For example, a cock, a hand, flowers, a cow’s head (shades of Borden’s 
“Elsie!”), a crab, an anchor, a lyre, a mask.”). 
 129 See generally Daniels, supra note 122, at 246 (“Signs for inns, now so common in England and 
Germany, were often seen in old Roman towns.  In Pompeii was an inn having the sign of an 
elephant and the notice, ‘Hospitium hic locatur, triclinium, cum tribus lectis et com (modis)’ – ‘Here is an inn, 
with a dining-room that has three comfortable couches.’ ”); Ruston, supra note 128, at 133 (“The 
cities of Pompeii and Herculanum have yielded considerable quantities of finds of interest.  
Amongst others are a number of shop and inn signs, carved on stone.  Some of the former were: a 
goat-a dairy; a mule-driven corn mill-the baker; a man beating a boy-the school master.”); 
Greenberg, supra note 122, at 880 (“The signboard has an ancient background.  The inn sign was 
often seen in the old Roman towns.  In excavated Pompeii was found an inviting inn sign displaying 
the picture of an elephant with the statement:– ‘Here is an inn, with a dining room that has three 
comfortable couches.’ ”); WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS 
AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS (FIRM-NAMES, BUSINESS-SIGNS, GOOD-WILL, LABELS, &C.) (1898) § 6, 
6 (“Among the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii have been discovered signs crudely painted, or 
graven in stone, or modeled in relievo in terra-cotta, and inserted in the pilasters at the side of the 
open shop-fronts.”); Rogers, supra note 113, at 31 (“Signs for inns and shops were as well known 
as they are now.”).  See also MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
§ 2:3 Historical background (August 2017 update); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 106, § 5:1 Early origins of 
trade symbols (4th ed.) (June 2017 update). 
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and by that name alone it must sue, and be sued, and do all legal acts.”130  And in 
Blackstone’s England, lawyers had already grasped the notion that intangible 
rights—such as trademarks—constituted a category of property: “incorporeal are 
not the object of sensation, can neither be seen nor handled, are creatures of the 
mind, and exist only in contemplation.”131  And, as further evidence that 
eighteenth-century British lawyers recognized other intangible rights closely 
associated with trademarks, Blackstone, as has been noted, expressly 
acknowledged both copyrights and patents.132  
And even to the extent that, since 1988, United States trademark law has 
recognized a limited, preliminary right to marks that have been adopted but not 
yet used in commerce—via the Intent-To-Use filing process133—Blackstone’s 
English laws recognized that initial pursuit of property acquisition could create 
limited, preliminary rights. According to Blackstone: “[I]f a man starts any game 
within his own grounds, and follows it into another’s, and kills it there, the 
property remains in himself.  And this is grounded on reason and natural justice: 
for the property consists in the possession; which possession commences by the 
finding in his own liberty, and is continued by the immediate pursuit.”134 
Professor Frank Schechter detailed the historical development of trademarks 
in his notable work The Historical Foundations of Law Relating to Trade-Marks.135  
                                                                                                                   
 130 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 72.  See also id. at 73 (“To have a common seal.  For a 
corporation, being an indivisible body, cannot manifest it’s [sic] intentions by any personal act or 
oral discourse: it therefore acts and speaks only by it’s [sic] common seal.”). 
 131 Id. at 78. 
 132 See id. at 205 (“There is still another species of property, which being grounded on labour and 
invention, is more reducible to the head of occupancy than any other.  And this is the right, which 
an author may be supposed to have in his own literary compositions: so that no other person 
without his leave may publish or make profit of the copies.”).  See also id. at 417 (“[S]tatute 21 Jac. 
I. c. 3. . . . declares . . . monopolies to be contrary to law and void; (except as to patents, not 
exceeding the grant of fourteen years, to new authors of new inventions. . . .”). 
 133 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) [Lanham Act § 1(b)] (b) Application for bona fide intention to use 
trademark.  See, e.g., M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“The Board concluded that Berger merely intended to reserve a right in the mark and thus lacked 
the requisite intent.  Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination, we affirm.”); 
id. at 1374 (“The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA) contemplated the very scenario 
presented by this case.  The TLRA changed the Lanham Act by permitting applicants to begin the 
registration process before actual use of the mark in commerce at the time of filing, so long as the 
applicant had a “bona fide intention . . . to use [the] mark in commerce” at a later date.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1051(b)(1) (emphasis added)”); id. at 1374 (“The prior version of the Lanham Act required that a 
trademark applicant already be using the mark in commerce at the time of the application’s filing 
to qualify for trademark registration.”); Commodore Electronics Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, *4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (“The determinative issue raised by the parties’ 
motions therefore becomes whether the absence of any documents evidencing applicant’s claimed 
intention to use its mark may be sufficient to constitute objective proof of a lack of a bona fide 
intention to use.”). 
 134 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 208. 
 135 See supra Introduction.  In addition to Professor Schechter’s work, there are a number of works 
that provide ample information on the history of trademarks.  See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 129; 
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Although making some passing references to the proprietary marks of ancient 
merchants,136 Schechter explores in far greater detail the developments of such 
marks in the British Isles and Northern Europe, beginning in the Middle Ages.137  
And in addition to addressing the development of trademarks and trademark law 
in general, Schechter recounts the genesis of trademarks in the guilds and in 
several specific trades, such as cutlery, cloth makers, printers and publishers, and 
bakers.138 Especially relevant to the disparagement clause of § 2(a), Schechter 
devotes considerable attention to the question of whether early trademark law 
recognized trademarks as a unique kind of property.139  Essentially he concludes 
that property law does indeed lie at the core of the recognition of an owner’s 
trademark rights.140  It is, in fact, fair to say that the earliest ancestors of modern 
legal doctrine contemplated that trademark owners were entitled to property 
rights in their marks.  So history supports Simon Tam and his band’s entitlement 
to consider their trademark “The Slants” as their property.141 
Similarly, modern trademark doctrine recognizes, as actionable, conduct that 
damages an owner’s mark in numerous ways.  And again, Blackstone’s discussion 
of damage to property shares the same basic concepts:  
As to the damage that may be offered to things personal, while in 
the possession of the owner, as hunting a man’s deer, shooting his 
dogs, poisoning his cattle, or in any wise taking from the value of 
any of his chattels, or making them in a worse condition than 
before, these are injuries too obvious to need explanation.142  
                                                                                                                   
Rogers, supra note 113, at 29; Daniels, supra note 122, at 239; Ruston, supra note 128, at 127; 
Diamond, supra note 117, at 265; Paster, supra note 15, at 551; Greenberg, supra note 122, at 876.  
 136 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 20.  
 137 Id. at 19–37. 
 138 Id. at 38–77. 
 139 Id. at 146–71.  See also Tam, 582 U.S. ___, (2017) Opinion of Alito, J. slip op. at 3 (remarking 
that, in 1946 when the Lanham Act was passed, trademarks, as is still true today, “often consisted 
of catchy phrases that convey a message”). 
 140 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 171 (“Using the term property in its modern legal sense . . . rights 
in or pertaining to trade-marks may be classified as property.”). 
 141 See, e.g., id. at 127 (“[I]t was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century that the lawyers 
or at any rate law-writers and lexicographers were evidently beginning to think at all in general terms 
of trade-marks and when they did so, their definitions of trade-marks indicated a still very 
considerable uncertainty on their part as to the exact function of a mark and as to the basis of 
complaint for the mis-use of a mark.”); id. at 128 (“In 1732 Jacob, in his New Law Dictionary, again 
says that a “mark of goods” is what ascertains the Property or Goodness thereof &c.  And if one 
Man shall use the Mark of another, to the intent to do him Damage, Action upon the Case lieth. 2 
Cro. 471.”). 
 142 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 284.  See also id. at 271–72 (“This action, of trespass, or 
transgression, on the case, is an universal remedy, given for all personal wrongs and injuries without 
force; so called because the plaintiff’s whole case or cause [272] of complaint is set forth at length 
in the original writ.”). 
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Interestingly, in his recounting of the development of trademark law from the 
Middle Ages to the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Schechter refers to only 
one trademark that was remotely risqué (i.e., a mark that may have been 
disparaging to persons, institutions, or beliefs). In that instance, a sixteenth-
century British printer had copied a French design of the Roman goddess Virtue, 
whose depiction was described as “a very ungainly and not too decent lady.”143  
But Schechter neither editorializes nor comments on the matter further. 
Apparently, neither those involved at the time nor Schechter considered a 
representation of a “not too decent lady” as having been improper to use as a 
trademark.144  Perhaps this potentially offensive representation of Virtue raised 
no red flags simply because its potentially offensive character was irrelevant to its 
status as a form of property owned by the printer.  Similarly, the disparagement 
clause has nothing to do with the fundamental property law principles that serve 
as the foundations of trademark law and policy.  
2. Trademarks as Protection from Fraud and Deceit.  In addition to basic acquisition 
of property rights, Blackstone discusses commercial law principles that reflect the 
roots of trademark infringement law.145  In modern United States trademark law, 
generally speaking, trademark infringement occurs when a defendant’s use of a 
mark is likely to cause confusion to an appreciable number of relevant 
consumers.146  The core concern that this principle addresses is that, due to a 
mistake caused by confusion, stemming from the similarity of a plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s marks, potential consumers might purchase the infringer’s goods 
rather than the trademark owner’s goods.147  In simple terms, a cause of action 
for trademark infringement has a number of goals.  One of those goals is to 
protect consumers by providing legal redress for the fraud and deception 
perpetrated on the public by an infringer.148  For example, if another band were 
                                                                                                                   
 143 SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 70. 
 144 Id. (“John Bydell’s figure of Virtue (a very ungainly and not too decent lady) is copied from a 
device used by Jacques Sacon, a Lyons printer of the beginning of this century.”). 
 145   
 146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) (AM. LAW INST. 1995). OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 PROOF OF 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION: MARKET FACTORS.  See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360 (C.C.P.A. 
1973); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. 
Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987); Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital 
LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (The CAFC affirmed a decision by the TTAB in which 
the TTAB analyzed likelihood of confusion using the Dupont factors: “The Board conducted the 
likelihood of confusion inquiry pursuant to the thirteen factors set forth in Application of E.I. DuPont 
DeNemours, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)”); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1293, 1307 (2015) (“The real question, therefore, is whether likelihood of confusion for 
purposes of registration is the same standard as likelihood of confusion for purposes of 
infringement.  We conclude it is, for at least three reasons.”). 
 147   
 148 Part III.B of this Article addresses in greater detail the relationship between trademarks and 
the First Amendment.  But here it is worth noting that when a government “seeks to regulate to 
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to adopt the name “The Slants” or a name confusingly similar to it, consumers 
might mistakenly purchase tickets to that band’s concert or might mistakenly 
purchase a CD or MP3-download of that band’s music instead of Simon Tam’s 
band.  In addition, a cause of action for trademark infringement seeks to prevent 
the unjust enrichment that might occur when duped consumers pay money for 
concert tickets, CD’s, or downloads to an infringer.149  Furthermore, a cause of 
action for trademark infringement provides some redress for any diminution of 
the owner’s reputation caused by an infringer’s use of a confusingly similar 
mark.150  And indeed Blackstone states the fundamental doctrine, which supports 
the concept of trademark infringement:  
When I once have gained a rightful possession of any goods, or 
chattels, either by just occupancy or by a legal transfer, whoever by 
fraud or force dispossesses me of them is guilty of a transgression 
against the law of society, which is a kind of secondary law of 
nature.151 
Beyond describing the general outlines of fraud and deceit, Blackstone also 
discusses in some detail specific examples of deception and fraud, and explains 
that such dishonesty lies at the heart of different species of commercial injuries.  
For example, he writes, “If anyone cheats me with false cards or dice, or by false 
weights and measures, or by selling me one commodity for another, an action on the case 
also lies against him for damages, upon the contracts which the law always 
implies, that every transaction is fair and honest.”152  Regarding deceit in 
particular, which, as has been noted, is an underlying issue in trademark 
infringement, he comments, “In contracts likewise for sales, it is constantly 
understood that the seller undertakes that the commodity he sells is his own; and 
if it proves otherwise, an action on the case lies against him, to exact damages for 
                                                                                                                   
prevent fraud, its law must be carefully tailored to achieve this purpose without unduly limiting 
speech.”  NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.28 at 754.  See id. (citing and discussing Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S. Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 
(1980)).  
 149 See, e.g., Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The infringer’s 
use of the markholder’s property to make a profit results in unjust enrichment that may properly 
be remedied through an award of profits . . . .”); Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., Nos. 97-5161, 96-
5167, 1998 WL 650080, at *3 (10th Cir. 1998) (“A number of courts recognize that a trademark is 
a protected property right . . . The infringer’s use of the markholder’s property to make a profit 
results in unjust enrichment that may properly be remedied through an award of profits, ‘even if 
the defendant and plaintiff are not in direct competition.’  Maltina Corp., 613 F.2d at 585. . . .  This 
theory of unjust enrichment has long been the rule in this Circuit.”). 
 150 See infra Section III.A.3 for more on the reputational interests protected by trademarks. 
 151 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 281. 
 152 Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
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this deceit.”153  And in a remark which captures the essence of a trademark 
infringer’s wrongdoing, Blackstone writes, “[T]here is also a particular remedy, 
entitled an action of deceit, to give damages in some particular cases of fraud; and 
principally where one man does any thing in the name of another.”154  
As is true with the principle that, legally, trademarks are a form of property, 
whether a mark may disparage persons, institutions, or beliefs has no bearing 
whatsoever on its potential to perpetrate fraud or to deceive consumers in a 
manner likely to cause consumer confusion.155  And in his concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy made this point quite clear, remarking: “This case does not 
present the question of how other provisions of the Lanham Act should be 
analyzed under the First Amendment.  It is well settled, for instance, that to the 
extent a trademark is confusing or misleading the law can protect consumers and 
trademark owners.”156 
3.  Trademarks and Reputation.  It is common, although by no means a 
categorical truth, for an infringer’s goods or services to be inferior to the goods 
or services of the owner of a mark.157 Thus, a trademark owner’s reputation (i.e., 
the perceptions that others have with regard to an individual or corporation) 
often suffers when consumers mistakenly purchase the inferior quality goods of 
someone who has usurped the owner’s mark.  It will be useful, therefore, briefly 
                                                                                                                   
 153 Id. See also id. at 416 (“Cheating is another offense, more immediately against the public trade; 
as that cannot be carried on without punctilious regard to common honesty and faith between man 
and man.  Hither therefore may be referred that prodigious multitude of statutes, which are made 
to restrain and punish deceits in particular trades, and which . . . are chiefly of use among trades 
themselves. **** Lastly, any deceitful practice, in cozening another by artful means, whether in 
matters of trade or otherwise, as by playing with false dice, or the like, is punishable with fine, 
imprisonment, and pillory.  And, by the statutes 33 Hen. VIII. C. 1. and 30 Geo. II. C. 24.  If any 
man defrauds another of any valuable chattels by colour of any false token, counterfeit letter, or 
false pretense, or pawns or disposes of another’s goods without the consent of the owner, shall 
suffer such punishment by imprisonment, fine, pillory, transportation, whipping, or other corporal 
pain, as the court shall direct.”). 
 154 Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
 155 See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 751 (“A mark that ‘may disparage,’ however, is not necessarily 
either false or misleading.”). 
 156 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768. 
 157 See, e.g., Adidas-America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1065 (D. Or. 2008) 
(“[A]didas has submitted evidence that Payless’ stripe designs negatively impact consumer 
perceptions of the [A]didas brand as a source of quality footwear.”); see also SCHECHTER, supra note 
15, at 54–56 (describing a case from 1440 where a baker from outside of London sold bread which 
bore the mark identical to that of a London baker.  According to the description, one of the 
principal problems that the London baker complained of was that the outsider’s bread was of 
inferior quality.); id. at 55 (“Hobold was afraid of being called to account if Halle's bread was found 
unsatisfactory. . . .”); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1644 (2006) (“[T]he likelihood of bridging the gap factor, and 
the comparative quality of the parties’ goods factor [considered only by the Second and D.C. 
Circuits], are remarkable for the degree to which courts either ignore them or bend them to 
conform to the outcome of the test.”). 
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to examine the notion of reputation and its relationship to trademarks—
especially potentially disparaging trademarks—in greater detail.    
One of the most important aspects of trademarks is that they represent a 
seller’s reputation.158  Trademarks are the means by which the public recognizes 
goods and services originating from any given seller (i.e., the source of the 
product or service).159  Thus consumers, in part, rely on their impressions of a 
seller’s reputation when they make decisions about whether to purchase goods 
and services.  No doubt, multiple factors are involved in consumer choices 
regarding reputation.  A seller’s trademark has the power to convey to potential 
consumers information about diverse aspects of a seller’s reputation regarding 
matters such as quality, integrity, value, and even social conscience (e.g., whether 
the seller has a reputation for being environmentally friendly, treating its 
employees fairly with wages, benefits, and healthy and safe workplaces, and the 
like).  Arguably, a seller who selects a trademark that an appreciable number of 
consumers regard as distasteful or offensive is likely to lose those consumers and 
those who sympathize with their point of view.  Hence, sellers who contemplate 
adopting disparaging or offensive trademarks must undergo a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine the probability of the negative impact that their adoption 
of such a mark will create a reputation so negative that it will decrease sales.160  
Indeed, reputation, or as those in the trademark business say “goodwill,” is 
one of the most important aspects of the value of trademarks to sellers.161  
                                                                                                                   
 158 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1752 (quoting San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 
483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987) (“[T]rademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by 
securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”); id. (quoting Park ‘N Fly Inc. v. Dollar 
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“The Lanham Act provides national protection of 
trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business . . . .”). See also 
Yale Elect. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (“[A merchant’s] mark is his 
authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill.  If 
another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own 
control.”). 
 159 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (2017) (noting that a trademark “helps consumers identify goods and 
services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want to avoid”). 
 160  ee VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 770–71 (“[I]f enough people refuse to support The Slants or 
Washington Redskins—or any other marks that ‘may disparage’—due to their objections to the 
offensive nature of those names or images, that conduct (i.e., refusal of support) and not an 
abridgement of the First Amendment, will provoke change.” (footnote omitted)); see also HALL, 
supra note 110, at 148 (“For Weber, social action was the prime datum of sociology and he drew a 
hard line between the professional or doctrinal study of law and the sociology of law; the legal 
sociologist studies social action ‘oriented to law.’ ” (referring to the scholarship of Max Weber)). 
 161 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1752 (2017) (quoting Park ‘N Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 
U.S. 189, 198, (1985) (“The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to 
secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business . . .”); see also Hanover Star Milling Co. 
v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (“The redress that is accorded in trademark cases is based upon 
the party’s right to be protected in the goodwill of a trade or business.  The primary and proper 
function of a trademark is to identify the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed.”); 
Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 547, 549 (2006) (“It is customary to refer to trademark law as protecting a seller’s goodwill in 
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Blackstone emphasizes the importance of laws that protect reputation. According 
to Blackstone, “The right of personal security consists in a person’s legal and 
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his 
reputation.”162  And he adds, “The security of his reputation or good name from 
the arts of detraction and slander, are also rights to which every man is entitled, 
by reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible to have the 
perfect enjoyment of any other advantages or right.”163  
As this observation of his suggests, Blackstone notes that reputation is an 
important issue as it relates to the debate concerning allegedly disparaging or 
offensive marks.  It is important from the perspective of both the seller (i.e., the 
trademark applicant) as well as the persons who perceive offense with a 
disparaging trademark.  On the one hand, a seller who adopts a potentially 
disparaging mark risks damaging its own reputation.  On the other hand, persons 
who feel slighted by a seller’s adoption of such a mark generally believe that their 
reputation has been damaged by the use of a symbol that they consider 
disparaging.164  Hence, this issue requires that we analyze both the interests at 
stake for sellers’ reputations and also those persons who feel slighted when the 
law permits sellers to adopt disparaging marks. 
First, as has been noted, to the extent that a trademark owner’s own 
reputation suffers as a result of his adoption and use of a mark that some consider 
offensive, he has chosen that mark at his peril.  Presumably, he has taken a 
calculated risk that the loss of potential consumers, who react negatively to the 
offensive nature of the mark, will be minimal, or at least outweighed by others 
who do not perceive the same offense or do not otherwise sympathize with those 
who do take offense.  The willingness of some sellers to adopt marks that others 
may consider disparaging or otherwise offensive may be interpreted as an 
indication that an appreciable segment of sellers in the modern marketplace is 
willing to risk losing some customers in order to gain others—others, who either 
don’t care or who might actually be attracted to the risqué or controversial nature 
of such a mark.165  Alternatively, if a mark owner is unaware of the potentially 
                                                                                                                   
its mark.  This familiar and well-accepted proposition has been part of the law since the latter half 
of the nineteenth century.  There is, however, a serious problem with this proposition.  
Characterizing trademark law in terms of goodwill protection ultimately conflicts with the well-
recognized consumer-oriented goals of trademark law.”); Rogers, supra note 114, at 176 (“Trade-
marks symbolize reputation, good or bad, and the trade-mark is valuable in exact proportion to the 
goodness or badness of the reputation which it symbolizes.  In this way, as Mr. Jefferson said, trade-
marks contribute to fidelity.  Thus, I suggest that the encouragement of signs of identity, whatever 
form they may take, stimulates competition by making possible free choice between competing 
merchants.” (footnote omitted)). 
 162 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 9. 
 163 Id. at 11. 
 164 See e.g., VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 700–01 (briefly summarizing scholarship that reflects the 
opinions of those, such as Native Americans, who have suffered from disparaging trademarks). 
 165 See HALL, supra note 110, at 159 (“Action by very large numbers of lay persons has 
considerable effect on official action.  The extreme cases in our experience of widespread violation 
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offensive nature of the mark when he adopts it (e.g., either because of ignorance 
or insensitivity), he nevertheless always has the option to change the mark to 
something non-disparaging (and perhaps to publicly apologize as well).  For 
example, even before the NCAA took an official position regarding Native 
American mascots, some colleges and universities dropped their Indian mascots 
voluntarily.166  And the NBA franchise that is today known as the Washington 
Wizards changed its name from “Bullets” to “Wizards” in response to the 
pejorative connotations associated with gun violence in and around the nation’s 
                                                                                                                   
of the liquor prohibition law, the default of farmers in the depression and their massive resistance 
to enforcement of mortgage and other debts, and more recent cases of civil disobedience reveal the 
importance of the relation of violation to the official action that is needed to transform the law in 
the books into social reality.”); id. at 147 (“[Llewellyn regarded laymen’s behavior as a ‘part of law’ 
and he also included ‘in the field of law’ not only the behavior of officials, their practices, and their 
contacts with laymen but, also, ‘sets of accepted formulae which judges recite, seek light from, try 
to follow, . . . various persons’ ideas of what the law is; and especially their views of what it or some 
part of it ought to accomplish . . . Farther from the center lies legal and social philosophy . . . Part 
of law, in many aspects, is all of society, and all of man in society.’ ” (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 110, at 40–41)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (“In short, a trademark conveys information that allows 
the consumer to say to himself, “I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to 
purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as 
that of the brand I enjoyed earlier”); id. at 270 (“The value of a trademark is the saving in search 
costs made possible by the information or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies 
about the brand (or the firm that produces the brand).  Creating such a reputation requires 
expenditures on product quality, service, advertising, and so on.  Once the reputation is created, 
the firm will obtain greater profits because repeat purchases and word-of-mouth references will 
generate higher sales and because consumers will be willing to pay higher prices for lower search 
costs and greater assurance of consistent quality.”); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1245, 1252 (2011) (“It is unlikely that any modern consumer can, on reflection, honestly 
characterize their myriad and varied purchasing decisions as a series of calculations to determine 
likelihood of preference-satisfaction based on a synthesis of product information conveyed by a 
trademark with product information obtained independently.  Many, if not most, consumer 
transactions—from purchasing a pack of gum at a drugstore checkout, to ordering a beer at a bar, 
to pre-ordering the latest tech gadget online—are considerably less systematic and analytical than 
the search-costs model can account for.”); id. at 1252 (“The marketing literature has developed 
tools for analyzing consumer decision-making, and particularly for analyzing the effect of 
trademarks (and of the related construct, brands) on that decision-making.”); id. at 1252-53 
(“Trademarks have multiple effects on consumers, each of which has different normative 
implications.  First, and consistent with the search-costs model, trademarks inform consumers: 
They provide consumers with objective information about the products and services to which they 
are affixed.  Second, trademarks persuade consumers: Marketing efforts can generate or change 
consumer preferences to align with whatever qualities—including subjective qualities—are 
perceived to be offered by a marked product.  The persuasive function of trademarks and 
advertising has long been a subject of intense debate in the economic and legal academic 
literatures.”). 
 166 See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 694–96 (discussing the NCAA regulations and policy relating to 
Native American mascots, names, and imagery considered “hostile and abusive”). 
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capital.167  To be sure, there are economic and social risks involved with choosing 
a trademark that is potentially disparaging or otherwise offensive. 
But the disparagement perceived by groups of people, such as persons of 
Asian ancestry, who feel disparaged by a band that calls itself “The Slants,” or 
Native Americans, who feel disparaged by a professional football team called 
“The Redskins,” is mostly irrelevant to the issue of reputation as it relates to 
trademarks.  Admittedly, Blackstone expressly states that, “injuries affecting a 
man’s reputation or good name, are, first, by malicious, scandalous, and slanderous 
words, tending to his damage and derogation.”168  Hence, at first blush, Blackstone 
appears to support the notion that a government may be within its rights to deny 
registration for marks that may disparage persons, institutions, or beliefs.  He 
further notes that, “[a] second way of affecting a man’s reputation is by printed 
or written labels, pictures, signs, and the like; which set him in an odious or 
ridiculous light, and thereby diminish his reputation.”169  Nevertheless, 
Blackstone also knew the importance of drawing a firm line between defamatory 
words or visual images versus what he refers to as “mere scurrility, or opprobrius 
words”: “But mere scurrility, or opprobrius words, which neither in themselves 
import, nor are in fact attended with any injurious effects, will not support an 
action.”170  Apparently then, “coarseness or indecency of language” appear to 
have been outside the scope of conduct deemed actionable in Blackstone’s 
England. 
Thus, insofar as a mark that “may disparage” can negatively affect the 
reputation of either its owner or those who perceive disparagement, logic and 
history again suggest that the potentially disparaging nature of a mark has little, if 
any, appreciable relevance to its ability to function as an indicator of source. 
4.  Trademarks and Religious Sensitivity.  Several of Blackstone’s discussions that 
are especially relevant to the disparagement clause deal with British laws that 
punished speech that offended religion and religious institutions.  Before Tam, a 
number of mainstream cases involving trademarks rejected by the PTO under 
the § 2(a) disparagement clause involved applications for marks that the 
examining attorney considered disparaging because of their relationship to 
                                                                                                                   
 167 See Harlem Wizards Entertainment v. NBA Properties, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1084 (1997).   
 168 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 272. 
 169 Id. at 273; see also id. (“[A]s to signs or pictures, it seems necessary always to shew, by proper 
innuendo’s and averments of the defendant’s meaning, the import and application of the scandal, and 
that some special damage has followed. . . .”); id. at 413 (“Of a nature very similar to challenges are 
libels, libelli famosi, which, taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, 
pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but in the sense under which we are now to 
consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public 
by either printing, writing, signs or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to 
public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.”). 
 170 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 273.  Scurrility has been defined as: “The quality of being 
scurrilous; buffoon-like jocularity; coarseness or indecency of language, esp. in invective and 
jesting.” Scurrility, OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1955). 
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religion.  For example, in In re Hines, the TTAB upheld the PTO examining 
attorney’s refusal to register the mark “Budda Beachwear,” “on the basis that the 
mark was disparaging to the religion of Buddhism.”171  Similarly, the TTAB 
affirmed the examiner’s refusal of “Khoran” for wine in In re Lebanese Arak 
Corp.172  Because the mark, “Khoran,” is the phonetic equivalent of “Koran,” the 
name of Islam’s holy book, and because the followers of “the Muslim Islamic 
faith believe that consuming alcohol is sinful,”173 the mark “Khoran” used in 
conjunction with wine was deemed disparaging to Muslims and the Muslim 
faith.174  Additionally, the case In re Heeb Media affirmed the PTO’s refusal to 
register the mark “Heeb” for apparel, “because, as slang for ‘Hebrew,’ it is a term 
considered offensive to Jews.”175  Blackstone recounts several statutes in his day 
that likewise targeted speech that disparaged religion.  For example,  
[B]y the statute 1 Edw. VI. c. 1. And 1 Eliz. C. 1.  that whoever 
reviles the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper shall be punished by 
fine and imprisonment; and by the statute 1 Eliz. C. 2 if any 
minister shall speak anything in derogation of the book of common 
prayer, he shall, if not beneficed, be imprisoned one year for the 
first offense, and for life for the second. . . .176  
He mentions another: “[I]t is enacted by statute 3 Jac. I. c. 21. that if in any stage 
play, interlude, or shew, the name of the holy trinity, or any of the persons therein, 
be jestingly or profanely used, the offender shall forfeit 10l. one moiety to the 
king, and the other to the informer.”177  In addition, without mentioning any 
particular statute, he says,  
And if any person whatsoever shall, in plays, songs, or other open 
words, speak anything in derogation, depraving, or despising of the 
said book, or shall forcibly prevent the reading of it, or cause any 
other service to be used in it’s stead, he shall forfeit for the first 
offense an hundred marks; for the second, four hundred; and for 
the third shall forfeit all his goods and chattels, and suffer 
imprisonment for life.178 
                                                                                                                   
 171 VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 687 (citing 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1686 (T.T.A.B. 1994)). 
 172 In re Lebanese Arak. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
 173 VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 696. 
 174 In re Lebanese Arak. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1221. 
 175 VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 697; In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1071–72. 
 176 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 369. 
 177 Id. at 374. 
 178 Id. at 369–70. 
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Furthermore, Blackstone writes that, under the common law, persons guilty of 
blasphemy are subject to a fine, incarceration, and bodily harm.179 
Arguably the cases cited above, where marks were rejected because of 
negative religious connotations, may well represent instances of PTO trademark 
examining attorneys putting their thumbs on the scales in a manner that conflicts 
with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  To be sure, certain 
members of religious groups benefitted as a result of the refusals of registration 
in Hines, Heeb Media, and Lebanese Arak.  On the surface, these cases appear to 
conflict with the both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, 
since, “[b]oth clauses prevent the government from singling out specific religious 
sects for special benefits or burdens.”180  Generally speaking, our First 
Amendment jurisprudence holds that, “[t]he use of religious beliefs as any type 
of standard for the granting of government benefits . . . might violate both the 
establishment and free exercise clauses by violating a religious neutrality principle 
that is central to both.”181  Yet the incidental benefits conferred by the PTO’s 
refusal to register Buddha Beachware, Heeb, and Koran may be sufficiently attenuated 
to escape conflict with either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause.182 
Blackstone notes that British law punished such speech expressly because 
“Christianity is part of the laws of England.”183  When one considers the serious 
effort on the part of the Framers of the United States Constitution to ensure a 
firm separation of church and state via the First Amendment,184 It seems wholly 
improper that trademark examiners have applied § 2(a)’s disparagement clause to 
disfavor marks that are potentially offensive to religious groups, since the 
Framers worked meticulously to ensure a firm separation of church and state 
through the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Id. at 374 (“[B]lasphemy against the Almighty, by denying his being or providence; or by 
contumelious reproaches of our savior Christ.  Whither also may be referred all profane scoffing at 
the holy scripture, or exposing it to contempt and ridicule.  These are offenses punishable at 
common law by fine and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment, for christianity is 
part of the laws of England.” (emphasis original)). 
 180 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 17.1, at 790.  See also id. § 17.6, at 830 (“The government 
may not . . . give benefits to people solely because of their religious beliefs.”).  
 181 Id. § 17.6, at 831. 
 182 Id. § 17.1, at 790 (“Unfortunately, situations arise where the government may have no choice 
but to incidentally help or hinder religious groups or practices.”); id. § 17.1, at 792 (“When 
examining a law that provides incidental aid to religion, the Supreme Court will question 
whether . . . the law creates an impermissible entanglement between government and religion.”); id. 
§ 17.3, at 794 (explaining the Supreme Court’s test for evaluating potential establishment clause 
violations). 
 183 BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 374.  See id. at 411 (“[M]ere quarrelsome words, which are 
neither an affray nor an offense in any other place, are penal here [i.e., “in a church or church-
yard”].”). 
 184 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at 790–857.  
34
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss1/8
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018  3:41 PM 
2017]   HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND REFLECTIONS  143 
B.  CORE FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES 
Although the cases mentioned above—cases involving rejection of marks that 
may have been disparaging because of religious connotations—may illustrate a 
First Amendment problem vis-a-vis the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, the Tam Court’s decision struck down the disparagement clause of 
§ 2(a) due to its conflict with the Freedom of Speech Clause.185  The First 
Amendment, in part, reads: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”186  Interestingly, the First Amendment, 
historically, has found ardent supporters among both liberals and conservatives.  
For example, Justice Brennan wrote, “the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”187  Similarly, Justice Scalia opined that the First Amendment 
forbids the government to regulate speech “based on hostility—or favoritism—
towards the underlying message expressed.”188  Strict adherence to First 
Amendment principles frequently touches sensitive nerves and has the capacity 
to cause extreme emotional conflict.189  But this discomfort is part of the price 
Americans pay for freedom.  Frankly, a restriction that prohibits the registration 
of trademarks that “may disparage” is unlikely to pose a danger remotely as 
serious as a restriction that prohibits the content or viewpoint expressed in 
speech of a purely political nature.  This admission, in part, is reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s creation of special First Amendment rules of analysis pertaining 
to commercial speech.190  Nevertheless, the foundational principles that animate 
Freedom of Speech doctrine serve as compelling reminders of why § 2(a)’s 
disparagement clause conflicts with the First Amendment.  
Senator Ervin explains the goal of the First Amendment, as “the Founding 
Fathers rightly believed that truth alone makes men free.  They desired, most of 
                                                                                                                   
 185 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 186 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.  See also ERVIN, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION 212 (“The Founding 
Fathers embodied these guarenties in the [First] Amendment for two reasons, one philosophical 
and the other pragmatic.  As philosophers, the Founding Fathers believed that free and full flow of 
information and ideas teaches men the truth which frees them from the worst sort of tyranny, i.e. 
tyranny over the mind; and as pragmatists, they believed that [the] free and full flow of information 
and ideas is vital to the civil and political institutions they established.  The Founding Fathers were 
right on both counts.”); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 615 (“Although the freedom 
of belief, or freedom of thought, is not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment, it is the core 
value of all of the clauses [in] the First Amendment… Justice Jackson explained that . . . freedom 
of belief was inviolate.”). 
 187 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 188 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
 189 See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (Nazi parade); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 
(2011) (protest held at a military funeral). 
 190 See generally Central Hudson, 477 U.S. 557 (1980) (The Supreme Court created the Central 
Hudson test). 
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all, that the people for whom they were creating a government should be 
politically, intellectually, and spiritually free.191 
According to Ervin, the Founding Fathers,  
could not guarantee that Americans would actually know the truth.  
But they could guarantee that Americans would have the right to 
know the truth, and make that right effective by conferring upon 
the people and denying to the government the power to determine 
what truth is.  And that is precisely what they did by the First 
Amendment.192  
Given that trademark law itself was in its infancy at the time of the drafting 
and ratification of the First Amendment, some might question whether it is even 
proper for us today to apply its principles to trademarks and the federal 
registration process.  Yet the evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence has 
demonstrated the judiciary’s willingness to apply the First Amendment to the 
ever-expanding, ever-developing means of “speech,” otherwise known as 
“communication.”  Senator Ervin addresses this very issue. 
When they first drafted and ratified the First Amendment, the 
Founding Fathers decreed that the freedoms it secures should 
extend into the future and apply to all activities falling within their 
scope, even though such activities were never envisaged by them.  
As a consequence, the First Amendment freedoms embodied in 
the phrase “freedom of speech or of the press” confer upon those 
who broadcast information or ideas by radio or television the 
constitutional right to do so, subject, however, to certain 
limitations. . . .”193 
Thus, the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment presumably 
extends therefore to trademark registration, although trademark registration was 
not yet implemented as a government activity when the Founding Fathers wrote 
and ratified the First Amendment. 
As a government agency, the PTO distributes the keys that allow trademark 
owners to unlock and enjoy a number of substantive legal advantages granted by 
federal registration.194  In an analogous fashion, as a government agency, the 
                                                                                                                   
 191 ERVIN, supra note 186, at 209.  See also id. (“[I]t [i.e., the First Amendment] forbids any 
governmental abridgement of its freedoms, which are aptly designed to make effective the right of 
the people to know the truth, and to govern themselves accordingly.”). 
 192 Id. at 209. 
 193 Id. at 211. 
 194 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753 (“Federal registration . . .’confers important legal rights and benefits 
on trademark owners who register their marks.’” (citations omitted)). 
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Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also distributes the keys that allow 
broadcasters to operate and enjoy the legal advantages provided by issuing 
broadcast licenses.  Consider how these remarks of Senator Ervin’s regarding the 
FCC’s restrictions on radio and television broadcasters might apply, by analogy, 
to the PTO’s application of the disparagement clause, restricting trademark 
registrations.  
Governmental regulation of radio and television broadcasters must 
be narrowly restricted.  Otherwise, it will violate the First 
Amendment, which undoubtedly forbids government to deny to a 
broadcaster freedom to broadcast the news or programs it chooses 
or the views it entertains.  I submit, moreover, that the FCC flouts 
the First Amendment if it revokes or refuses to renew a license to 
broadcast merely because it dislikes the political views the 
broadcaster expresses. . . .195  
And Ervin emphasizes this very point, stating again: 
During recent times, persons exercising powers of government 
have done many things incompatible with the First Amendment.  
Among them were these things. . . . The refusal of the Federal 
Communications Commission to renew licenses of religiously 
affiliated radio stations because their broadcasts were displeasing 
to adherents of other creeds and segments of the public. . .”196 
The disparagement clause of § 2(a) was a paternalistic law, which allowed the 
Government to deny trademark registrations that the PTO examining attorneys 
believed would harm the feelings of some people.  Senator Ervin views this goal 
as inconsistent with First Amendment principles: “It is not the function of 
government in a free society to protect its citizens against thoughts or 
associations it deems dangerous, or to stigmatize its citizens for thoughts or 
associations it thinks hazardous.”197  
Americans cherish freedom as one of their most important values.  As is true 
in many legal disputes, the sustainability of the disparagement clause pitted the 
competing interests of two groups of people against one another.  Those 
competing interests illustrate the conflict inherent between them; and, that 
inherent conflict centered on the interest that both groups have in what each 
                                                                                                                   
 195 ERVIN, supra note 186, at 212. 
 196 Id. at 214–15.  In Part IV, the similarity between the FCC and the PTO as government agencies 
will help inform suggestions for revision to the Lanham Act’s definition of the words “immoral” 
and “scandalous.”  Senator Ervin’s observations about the relationship between the FCC and the 
First Amendment are especially relevant. 
 197 ERVIN, supra note 186, at 216. 
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perceived to be its rights to a certain kind of freedom.198  One group, sellers of 
goods and services, desires the freedom to select and secure rights to trademarks 
that they consider beneficial for their businesses.199  They generally seek to 
maximize profits by selecting marks that they hope will appeal to their customers.  
That appeal may be attributable to a variety of factors, one of which may be the 
controversial (some might say “edgy” or “spicy”) nature of the message conveyed 
by a mark.  As has been noted, sellers who choose controversial marks risk 
alienating some segments of their potential consumer base.200  But the Tam 
decision allows that the freedom to undertake that risk is guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.  On the other hand, the second group, people who feel disparaged 
by such marks, presumably want the freedom not to be subjected to the 
emotional/psychological pain that the presence of such marks in the public 
marketplace causes to them.  As between the interests of these two groups—
sellers who want freedom to select controversial trademarks versus members of 
the public who seek freedom from emotional injury—the Supreme Court’s Tam 
decision teaches that the First Amendment tips the scales in favor of the sellers 
to select and protect controversial marks.201 
The emotionally-charged desires of those offended by trademarks that “may 
disparage” them must take a backseat to the higher-order goals of the First 
Amendment.202  Senator Ervin would have applauded the Tam decision for its 
recognition that, as a rule, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of 
expression must supersede the interests of individuals and groups of individuals, 
who merely wish to avoid bruised feelings.  According to Ervin: 
Like all freedom, freedom of speech and of the press are always in 
peril; and the price of their keeping is eternal vigilance, and an 
                                                                                                                   
 198 See id. (“The foes of freedom never tire. Consequently, freedom is always in jeopardy. The 
price of its keeping is eternal vigilance, and an unceasing readiness to guard and defend it.”). 
 199 See, e.g., HALL, supra note 110, at 6 (“For still other legal philosophers, the most important 
question to ask about law is its functional competence, its ability to do the jobs that are vitally 
important, e.g., to maintain order, allocate values fairly, and promote social welfare.”); id. at 42 
(“Freedom, for Kant, is the basic value from which all other values flow and on which they depend; 
conformity to external duties is the sine qua non of ‘the kingdom of ends,’ where each individual has 
the maximum freedom compatible with the like for all other persons.” (quoting and citing 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 45 (William Hastie ed., 1887)). 
 200 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 201 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454, 455 (2011) (Judgment in favor of a father for 
intentional infliction of emotion distress against Westboro Baptist fundamentalist church for 
protesting near the funeral of his son who had died in military service was reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court on constitutional First Amendment grounds.  The speech of the church members 
who picketed near the funeral was held to be of public concern and therefore was entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment.). 
 202 See HALL, supra note 110, at 46 (“[T]he themes that rules of law (and congruent actions) having 
ethical significance, are intelligible and must be distinguished from desires and emotions, that 
(sound) rules of law and actions are intrinsically valuable and, also, useful, and that their validity can 
be objectively tested. . . .”). 
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unceasing readiness to guard and defend them.  Strange as it may 
seem, freedom has many foes, even among those who profess to 
love it.  Some men are annoyed by the abuse of freedom by others 
and advocate its abridgment to prevent its further abuse.  Other 
men fear the exercise of freedom by others and demand its 
curtailment to quiet their fears.  And government itself tends to 
dislike freedom in general because it obstructs the exercise of 
arbitrary power and freedom of speech and of the press in 
particular because they are the instruments which expose official 
mismanagement and misconduct.203  
Some will, no doubt, criticize the Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate the 
disparagement clause by arguing that it contradicts the express design of 
Congress, and these critics may allege that the decision dismantles the carefully 
balanced doctrinal structure that the PTO and courts have crafted to construe 
§ 2(a) over the course of several decades.  The bench and bar have, after all, 
become familiar with the application of the law in its settled form. Jurisprudential 
scholar, Professor Jerome Hall, reflects upon these very concerns:  
[T]here is a tendency to accept and approve what is familiar or 
customary.   But to make that the sole, sweeping basis of the origin 
and the present meaning of moral ideas flies in the face of common 
experience and the frequent use of moral language, sometimes in 
direct criticism of what is familiar or customary.204 
The First Amendment provides broad latitude for both political and 
commercial discourse. Senator Ervin reminds us that it provides a stage for all, 
without regard to whether the speaker’s message is wise or unwise, casts light or 
imposes darkness, or reflects insight or stupidity.205  But the consensus of the 
Founding Fathers was that freedom of speech is necessary for a free society. And 
                                                                                                                   
 203 ERVIN, supra note 186, at 214.  See also id. (“[T]he Founding Fathers embodied in the First 
Amendment the guaranties of freedom of speech and of the press to give our people security against 
laws and all other governmental actions that are designed to suppress the communication of 
information or to stifle the expression of ideas.”).  See also id. at 210 (“First Amendment freedoms 
are often grossly abused; and, in consequence, society is sorely tempted at times to demand or 
countenance their curtailment by government to prevent their abuse.  Our country must steadfastly 
spurn this temptation if it is to remain the land of the free.  This is so because the only way to 
prevent the abuse of freedom is to abolish freedom.”). 
 204 HALL, supra note 110, at 60. 
 205 See ERVIN, supra note 186, at 210 (“The First Amendment is impartial and inclusive.  It bestows 
its freedoms on all persons within our land, regardless of whether they are wise or foolish, learned 
or ignorant, profound or shallow, brave or timid, devout or ungodly, and regardless of whether 
they love or hate our country and its institutions.”). 
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as long as modern America embraces that same consensus, we must continue to 
accept the negative effects along with the positive. Grant Gilmore writes: 
The function of law, in a society like our own, is altogether more 
modest and less apocalyptic.  It is to provide a mechanism for the 
settlement of disputes in the light of broadly conceived principles 
on whose soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general 
consensus among us.  If the assumption is wrong, if there is no 
consensus, then we are headed for war, civil strife, and revolution, 
and the orderly administration of justice will become an irrelevant, 
nostalgic whimsy until the social fabric has been stitched together 
again and a new consensus has emerged.  But, so long as the 
consensus exists, the mechanism which the law provides is 
designed to insure that our institutions adjust to change, which is 
inevitable, in a continuing process which will be orderly, gradual, 
and, to the extent that such a thing is possible in human affairs, 
rational.206 
IV.  A PROPOSAL 
Now that the Supreme Court has given sellers license to register marks that 
“may disparage,” the PTO will undoubtedly see an increase in applications to 
register marks that some will consider offensive.  And, as has been suggested, to 
a certain extent market forces will play a significant role in the success or failure 
of products and services sold under such disparaging or offensive marks.  Adolf 
Hitler-brand ice cream, for example, is unlikely to prove to be a national best 
seller any more than Nigger-brand shoe polish.  Open-mindedness and a thick-
skinned attitude towards this development will help Americans weather this 
storm. 
One issue that posed a particular problem regarding the constitutionality of 
the disparagement clause was its overbreadth and vagueness.  Both words—
“may” and “disparage”—elude precise definition.207  Without question, precision 
in defining statutory (or any other legal terminology) is a primary goal.  Professor 
Jerome Hall writes that the “salient feature” of linguistic jurisprudence “is 
concentration on the use of words.”208  According to Hall, “[O]rdinary words are 
used in a technical legal sense, and it requires a great deal of study, in effect a legal 
                                                                                                                   
 206 GRANT, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
 207 See VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 737–48 (discussing in detail the vague and overbroad character 
of the words “may” and “disparage”). 
 208 HALL, supra note 110, at 78 (“So far as any generalization may be ventured, it may be said that 
their [i.e., examples of linguistic jurisprudence] salient feature is concentration on the use of words.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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education, to understand how those terms are used.”209  But when the language 
used is vague, as was the case with “may disparage,” he admonishes that the 
problem of interpretation is especially difficult because, “what seems to be a 
simple question turns out to be a very large array of problems that involve whole 
philosophies of law and an inevitable degree of subjectivity.”210 
Diversity of opinion is powerful.211  Those who solve problems often do so 
by embracing a fresh perspective and approaching problems in novel ways.  The 
Tam opinion gives those who sell products and services an opportunity to register 
trademarks that some members of our society will consider disrespectful and 
offensive.  As has been acknowledged, to some degree the marketplace will 
dictate whether sellers who take such risks will find success using disparaging 
marks.  The Founding Fathers would have approved.212  But arguably there are 
some marks that are so vulgar and offensive that they would be objectionable to 
our society’s commonly accepted standards of decency.  Presumably, our federal 
trademark law ought to be capable of drawing a line that will prevent registration 
of what the Government’s lawyers have characterized as “the most vile racial 
epithets”213 and “scandalous words and lewd photographs.”214 
Fortunately, in addition to its now-obsolete and defunct disparagement 
clause, § 2(a) also prohibits registration of marks that comprise “immoral, 
deceptive or scandalous matter.”215  The law regarding the word “deceptive” is 
fairly well established; cases have provided thorough guidance in construing 
“deceptiveness.”216  But, although there is some case law construing the words 
                                                                                                                   
 209 Id. at 82. 
 210 Id. at 135. 
 211 See ERVIN, supra note 186, at 212 (1984) (“Freedom of speech and of the press are the things 
that distinguish our country most sharply from totalitarian regimes.  They enable our country to 
enjoy a diversity of ideas and programs, and to escape the standardization of ideas and programs 
totalitarian tyranny requires.”). 
 212 See e.g., id. at 210 (“The Founding Fathers believed—and I think rightly—that the best test of 
truth is its ability to get itself accepted when conflicting ideas compete for the minds of men.  And, 
so, the Founding Fathers staked the existence of America as a free society upon their faith that it 
has nothing to fear from the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, no matter how much they 
may be abused, as long as it leaves truth free to combat error.”). 
 213 En banc brief for Appellee at 22, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1203). 
 214 En banc brief for Appellee at 23, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1203). 
 215 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).  See also VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 685–86; id. at 686 n.31; 
Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (“Such 
definitions include ‘shocking to the sense of . . . decency, or propriety . . . offensive. . . .’ ” (quoting 
FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1945))).  This Board has also determined 
that ‘vulgar,’ defined as lacking in taste, indelicate and morally crude, is also considered scandalous 
matter (citing In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971)). 
 216 See e.g., In re Budge Manufacturing Co., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Stamatios Mouratidis, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 218, at *16 (T.T.A.B. May 21, 2010) (“In view of the 
foregoing we find that applicant’s mark ORGANIC ASPIRIN for dietary supplements for human 
consumption is both deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(1) and deceptive under Section 
2(a).”). 
41
VerSteeg: Historical Perspectives & Reflections on "Matal v. Tam" and the F
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2018 3:41 PM 
150  J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:109 
“immoral” and “scandalous,” it is far from crystal clear.  For example, In re Fox 
considered whether the mark “Cock Sucker” could be registered.217  In affirming 
the PTO’s determination that the mark could not be registered under § 2(a)’s 
“scandalous” bar, the CAFC observed:  
[W]hat constitutes “immoral . . . or scandalous matter” has 
evolved over time.  The formal legal framework, however, has 
remained consistent: in order to refuse a mark, “the [Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO)] must demonstrate that the mark is 
‘shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; 
offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the conscience or 
moral feelings; . . . [or] calling out [for] condemnation.’ ” [T]he 
PTO may prove scandalousness by establishing that a mark is 
“vulgar.”218 
And in a case currently before the CAFC, In re Brunetti, the TTAB stated that, 
“the word ‘vulgar’ captures the essence of the prohibition against registration,” 
and thus held that the applicant’s mark “FUCT” likewise was unregistrable under 
§ 2(a)’s “scandalous” bar.219 
On December 15, 2017, a three-judge panel of the CAFC agreed that the mark 
“FUCT” “comprises immoral or scandalous matter,” but held, “that § 2(a)’s bar 
on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of 
free speech.”220 More specifically, the CAFC stated that the immoral or 
scandalous provision “impermissibly discriminates based on content in violation 
of the First Amendment.”221 Judge Moore reasoned that, because “the immoral 
or scandalous prohibition targets the expressive components of [ ] speech,”222 
and “regulates the expressive components of speech, not the commercial 
                                                                                                                   
 217 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 218 In Re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  See 
generally Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous 
or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476 (2011).  See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1638 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (“The cases have referred to dictionary definitions extant 
at the time the Lanham Act was enacted as indicating the matter encompassed by the term 
‘scandalous’.  Such definitions include ‘shocking to the sense of . . . decency, or propriety, . . . 
offensive . . .,’ Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary, (1945).  This Board has also determined 
that ‘vulgar,’ defined as lacking in taste, indelicate and morally crude, is also considered scandalous 
matter.  In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (‘BUBBY TRAP’ for brassieres.)”). 
 219 2014 TTAB LEXIS 328, at 14-15 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (“We have seen from the dictionary 
definitions of record that ‘fucked’ and its phonetic twin, ‘fuct,’ are both vulgar terms.  Whether one 
considers ‘fucked’ as a sexual term, or finds that Applicant has used ‘fucked/fuct’ in the context of 
extreme misogyny, nihilism or violence, we have no question but that these are still extremely 
offensive terms in the year 2014.”). 
 220 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 221 Id. at 1341. 
 222 Id. at 1349. 
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components of speech…it should be subject to strict scrutiny.”223 And Judge 
Moore went further still, holding that, “Section 2(a)’s bar on the registration of 
immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional even if treated as a regulation of 
purely commercial speech reviewed according to the intermediate scrutiny 
framework established in Central Hudson.”224  She held that the Government failed 
to prove that it has a substantial government interest.225  In addition, Judge 
Moore’s opinion held that the Government was unable to “meet the third prong 
of Central Hudson, which requires the regulation directly advance the 
government’s asserted interest.”226  And the Government has requested a 
rehearing en banc.  
Consequently, now, in the aftermath of Tam, may be an especially opportune 
time for lawmakers to define the words “immoral” and “scandalous” in a way 
that balances a degree of moral decency with the First Amendment’s protections 
for Freedom of Speech.  Indeed there are some categories of speech that fall 
outside the scope of First Amendment protections.  In his concurring opinion in 
Tam, Justice Kennedy expressly acknowledges, “Those few categories of speech 
that the government can regulate or punish—for instance, fraud, defamation, or 
incitement—are well established within our constitutional tradition.”227  More 
specifically, those categories include: (1) Libel; (2) Incitement to Violence; (3) 
Obscenity; (4) Child Pornography; (5) Fighting Words; and, (6) False 
Advertising.228  The Tam opinion does not address registration of marks that are 
“immoral” or “scandalous matter,” but only marks that “may disparage.”  
                                                                                                                   
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 1350 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 
U.S. 577 (1980)) (internal citations omitted). 
 225 Id. (stating that “Central Hudson’s second prong, requiring a substantial government interest, is 
not met.”); id. at 1531(stating that “the government has failed to identify a substantial interest 
justifying its suppression of immoral or scandalous trademarks.”). 
 226 Id. at 1354–55(stating that “the government has failed to demonstrate that its restriction will 
advance the interests it asserts and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.”). 
 227 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
 228 See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 666 (“The Supreme Court has allowed 
the punishment of speech based on content if the content is limited to the proscription of: (1) 
speech that incites imminent lawless action; (2) speech that is integral to the commission of a crime; 
(3) speech that triggers an automatic violent response (so-called “fighting words” or the related 
“hostile audience” problem); (4) “true threats;” (5) obscenity (which the Court narrowly defines to 
exclude much material that the popular press often describes as pornography; (6) child pornography 
(a limited category of speech involving photographs and films of young children); (7) certain types 
of defamatory speech; and (8) certain types of commercial speech (primarily false or misleading 
speech connected to the sale of a service or product, or offers to engage in illegal activity.”).  See 
also ERVIN, supra note 186, at 209–10 (“In its final analysis, the First Amendment compels the 
government to grant to every person within the borders of our land . . . Freedom to convey to 
others with impunity by speech, writing, print, picture, signal, or any other medium of 
communication whatever, any information or ideas he wishes as long as what he says or publishes 
does not slander or libel others; invade the privacy of others; constitute obscenity or legal fraud; 
incite crime or violence; obstruct courts in the administration of justice, or legislative bodies in their 
proceedings; amount to sedition, or imperil the national security.”); id. at 210 (“As appears from 
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Thus, one sensible approach in the post-Tam era, as the bench and bar move 
ahead into the uncharted waters of a principal register that allows registration of 
marks that “may disparage,” will be, at least in part, to define the words 
“immoral” and “scandalous matter” as including precisely those categories.  For 
example, the definition might state,  
The words “immoral” or “scandalous matter” include but are not 
limited to content that contains or comprises categories of speech 
considered to fall outside of First Amendment protection (i.e., 
“unprotected speech”); including: 1) Libel; 2) Incitement to 
Violence; 3) Obscenity; 4) Child Pornography; 5) Fighting Words; 
and, 6) False Advertising.  
Admittedly, although these categories have not been defined with laser-like 
precision, the Supreme Court has forged a rather comprehensive jurisprudence 
for most that is fairly well developed.229 
But it is also possible that the definition of “immoral” and “scandalous 
matter” could be broader and benefit from the lessons of FCC v. Pacifica 
                                                                                                                   
this statement, First Amendment Freedoms are not absolute. According to a famous observation 
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, no one is at liberty to shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theater.  To add 
illustrations, the Amendment does not privilege anyone to call an honest man a thief, or a virtuous 
woman a whore, or to provoke another to violence by addressing foul epithets to him.”).  See also 
VerSteeg, supra note 3, at 735–37 (discussing these categories and comparing the complaints of 
Native Americans regarding sports mascots to the plight of the plaintiffs in cases such as Virginia 
v. Black (538 U.S. 343 (2003)), where defendants burned a cross on their property in an effort to 
intimidate them); BLACKSTONE, supra note 117, at 413 (“The direct tendency of these libels is the 
breach of the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps bloodshed.”). 
 229 For discussions of a number of these categories of unprotected speech, see e.g., NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.5, at 665–70 (advocacy of criminal activity); id. § 16.5, at 699 (“[O]nly 
when speech causes unthinking, immediate reaction is the protection of the First Amendment 
withdrawn.”); id. § 16.5, at 702 (reciting the Brandenburg test used “to judge laws that restrict speech 
that advocates unlawful conduct”); id. § 16.18, at 711–18 (“Fighting Words and Hostile 
Audiences.”); id. § 16.18(a), at 769 (discussing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 
(1942) as having defined “fighting words” as “face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of 
the peace by the addressee,” and stating “Chaplinsky’s basic test was whether or not people of 
common intelligence would understand the words as likely to cause the average addressee to 
fight.”); id. § 16.18(a), at 772 (quoting Justice Harlan in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) for 
the proposition that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”); id. § 16.18(c), at 773 (discussing 
important cases on threats and intimidation, such as R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377, 112 
(1992) and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 2003), and summarizing the doctrine by quoting Virginia 
v. Black: “Intimidation on the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat.  
Where the speaker directs a threat to a person or a group of persons with the intent of placing the 
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”); id. §§ 16.34–16.37, at 835–55 (obscenity); id. § 16.36, at 
838 (definition of “obscenity” from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); id. § 16.37(c), at 778-
80 (child pornography)). 
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Foundation.230  In Pacifica, “[t]he Court held that the FCC does have the statutory 
authority and constitutional power to regulate a radio broadcast that is ‘indecent’ 
but not ‘obscene’ in the constitutional sense, at least under circumstances where 
the indecent broadcast would be available to a high percentage of children.”231  
Curiously, in Brunetti, the CAFC considered the potential impact of Pacifica but 
rejected its reasoning, stating. “The government’s interest in protecting the public 
from profane and scandalous marks is not akin to the government’s interest in 
protecting children and other unsuspecting listeners from a barrage of swear 
words over the radio in Pacifica. A trademark is not foisted upon listeners by virtue 
of its being registered. Nor does registration make a scandalous mark more 
accessible to children.”232  But it might be useful to examine Pacifica more closely. 
In Pacifica, according to the Supreme Court, the FCC exercised its power to 
regulate radio broadcasting, relying primarily on “18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.), 
which forbids the use of ‘any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means 
of radio communications.’ ”233  And in a footnote, the Court explained that 
broadcasting, as a form of expression, deserved, 
special treatment because of four important considerations: (1) 
children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised 
by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where 
people’s privacy interest is entitled to extra deference; (3) 
unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning that 
offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a 
scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must 
therefore license in the public interest.  Of special concern to the 
Commission as well as parents is the first point regarding the use 
of radio by children.234 
Clearly, the Pacifica majority based its holding, in significant part, on the pervasive, 
ubiquitous nature of radio broadcasting and its omnipresence in daily life.  
According to the Court, radio broadcasting is “a uniquely pervasive presence in 
the lives of all Americans”235 and “is uniquely accessible to children, even those 
too young to read. . . .”236  The Court noted in particular: “Patently offensive, 
indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in 
                                                                                                                   
 230 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  The CAFC is acutely aware of Pacifica.  In fact, the CAFC cited Pacifica 
in In re Fox, noting that, “the word ‘cocksucker’ is generally patently ‘indecent’ under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464 [i.e., the statute relevant in that case].” 702 F.3d 633, 637 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 231 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 16.8, at 661. 
 232 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1353.  
 233 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726. 
 234 Id. at 731 n.2 (internal citations omitted). 
 235 Id. at 748. 
 236 Id. at 749.  
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public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left 
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”237 
Registered trademarks share most of these same characteristics as radio 
broadcasting.238  Trademarks bombard our senses nearly every hour of the day 
via multiple communications platforms, including radio, television, Internet, 
street signage, and print media.  In his concurring opinion in Tam, Justice 
Kennedy makes this very same observation: 
These marks make up part of the expression of everyday life, as 
with the names of entertainment groups, broadcast networks, 
designer clothing, newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, toys, and 
so on.  Nonprofit organizations—ranging from medical-research 
charities and other humanitarian causes to political advocacy 
groups—also have trademarks, which they use to compete in a real 
economic sense for funding and other resources as they seek to 
persuade others to join their cause.239 
Thus, contrary to the CAFC’s dismissal of the potential analogy of radio 
broadcasting to the proliferation of trademarks in our daily lives, including a ban 
on “indecent or profane” words, names, symbols or devices as part of the 
definition of the words “immoral” and “scandalous,” may pass constitutional 
muster under Pacifica.240  This is especially true since the refusal to register such 
immoral or scandalous marks simply decreases the likelihood that putative 
applicants will select immoral or scandalous marks. And at oral argument for In 
re Brunetti, counsel for the parties and the CAFC panel devoted a considerable 
amount of discussion to the possibility of applying Pacifica. Judge Dyk, in 
                                                                                                                   
 237 Id. at 748 (citation omitted). 
 238 Trademarks are analogous to radio broadcasting in at least the first three “important 
considerations” articulated by the Court in footnote 2. 
 239 See Tam, 582 U.S. ___, (2017) Opinion of Kennedy, J. slip op. at 6 (internal citations omitted).  
See also Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE 
L.J. 1165, 1168 (1948) (“The buying public submits to a vast outpouring of words and pictures 
from the advertisers, in which, mingled with exhortations to buy, is a modicum of information 
about the goods offered.”). 
 240 The Pacifica Court included a transcript of the George Carlin monologue “Filthy Words,” as 
an appendix to the opinion. Pacifica at 751–55.  Although it does not necessarily identify which 
words qualify as “indecent” or “profane” within the meaning of the statute, Carlin’s monologue 
provides some guidance.  For example, he suggests that there are seven words that are verboten: 
“The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.”  Pacifica 
at 751.  By way of explanation, he explains, “Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow 
hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor 
(laughter) urn, and a bourbon. (laughter).”  Pacifica at 751.  After humorously examining those words 
for the lion’s share of the monologue, he then later adds three more words to his list: “I found 
three more words that had to be put on the list of words you could never say on television, and 
they were fart, turd and twat, those three. (laughter).” Pacifica at 755. 
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particular, suggested that the court could narrowly construe the language of § 2(a) 
in a manner that would treat the terms “immoral” or “scandalous” as equivalent 
to Pacifica’s “indecent.”241 And in his concurring opinion, he expressed the 
viewpoint that the court is “obligated to construe the statute to avoid these 
constitutional questions” and noted that, “[a] saving construction of a statute 
need only be ‘fairly possible,’ and ‘every reasonable construction must be resorted 
to.’ ”242  Judge Dyk urged that, “One such fairly possible reading is available to 
us here by limiting the clause’s reach to obscene marks, which are not protected 
by the First Amendment.”243 Presumably, if trademarks were analyzed as 
commercial speech under the Central Hudson test, one could reasonably argue that 
protecting children and others from “profane” or “indecent” material would 
constitute an important Government interest, and that interpreting § 2(a) 
narrowly—using Pacifica as the benchmark—would constitute “narrow 
tailoring.”244     
Hence, if one were to include—relying on Pacifica—a prohibition on 
“indecent or profane” words, names, symbols, or devices in the “immoral” and 
“scandalous matter” definition, that definition might read as follows: 
The words “immoral” and “scandalous matter” include, but are 
not limited to content that contains or comprises categories of 
speech considered to fall outside of First Amendment protection 
(i.e., “unprotected speech”); including but not limited to: 1) Libel; 
2) Incitement to Violence; 3) Obscenity; 4) Child Pornography; 5) 
Fighting Words; 6) False Advertising; and 7) Indecent or Profane 
Matter.  The meaning of the words “Indecent or Profane” in this 
definition is used in the manner articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 57 
L. Ed. 2d 1073 (1978). 
                                                                                                                   
 241 Curiously counsel for the Government was hesitant, even when invited by the court, to argue 
that protection of children was a substantial government interest in upholding the “immoral” or 
“scandalous” language of § 2(a).  Counsel for the Government did, however, argue that the words 
in the Carlin monologue, depicting graphic depictions of sex, genitalia, and similar material would 
be prohibited.  Counsel for Brunetti was not willing to concede that the court is at liberty to 
interpret the statute narrowly.    
 242 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d. 1358 (Dyk, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Thus, Brunetti may ultimately prove to be the case that forces the courts to decide whether 
trademarks constitute “commercial speech.” Also note that this suggested interpretation simply 
disagrees with three conclusions of Judge Moore’s majority opinion: (1) that trademarks alleged to 
be immoral or scandalous must be subject to strict scrutiny; (2) that the Government has failed to 
prove an important governmental interest; and, (3) that § 2(a)’s immoral or scandalous provision is 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 
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Whether by judicial decision, PTO regulation, or an act of Congress,245 
defining the words “immoral” and “scandalous matter” in this manner has the 
potential to draw a much clearer line between permissible versus impermissible 
trademarks than the vague and overbroad language of “may disparage.”246  Such 
a definition of “immoral” and “scandalous matter” also should provide clearer 
guidance for PTO examining attorneys, provide reassurance for those who fear 
registration of marks that are excessively vulgar, and most importantly, it should 
allow the First Amendment to continue to function as an appropriate arbiter of 
what is acceptable for federal trademark registration in the United States. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Part II of this Article summarized the Supreme Court’s Matal v. Tam opinion.  
Tam makes it clear that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment nullifies 
the disparagement clause of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act.  It also clarifies that 
federally registered trademarks are not government speech.  Part III explored the 
historical origins of several fundamental, foundational principles of trademark 
law and trademark law’s relationship with reputation and religion.  In particular, 
it considered that: (1) trademarks are a form of property; (2) trademark law 
developed, in part, to protect consumers from fraud and deceit; (3) trademarks 
have the power to affect reputations; and, (4) trademarks have had a unique 
relationship with religious beliefs.  This Part also concluded that none of these 
foundational principles or relationships mandate that federal law prohibit 
registration of marks that might disparage persons, institutions, or beliefs.  Part 
III also explained that the principles that animate the First Amendment shed light 
on why the Free Speech clause renders the disparagement clause of § 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act unconstitutional. Part IV offered a possible solution to help prevent 
truly objectionable trademark registrations while maintaining the freedom of 
speech that is vital to our liberty as Americans.  Presumably, as Americans, we 
can balance a number of competing interests while still maintaining a functioning 
system of federal trademark registration.  That system should be capable of 
enhancing economic efficiency, allowing robust freedom of expression, and 
maintaining at least a modest degree of public decency. 
                                                                                                                   
 245 Judge Moore indirectly invited Congress to amend the statute: “The concurrence proposes 
that we ‘narrow the immoral-scandalous provision’s scope to obscene marks in order to preserve 
its constitutionality.’  While the legislature could rewrite the statute to adopt such a standard, we 
cannot.”  In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1355 (internal citations omitted).  
 246  See GRANT, supra note 2, at 90 (“The obvious alternative to a judicial solution of such problems 
is a legislative solution.  A legislative committee, unlike a court, can analyze a problem in depth and 
cut thorough to a rational solution.”). 
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